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Gregory S. Gordon* 
 
“Perfection is impossible; like other human institutions criminal 
proceedings must be a compromise.” 
 
Judge Learned Hand1
“It is by compromise that human rights have been abandoned.” 
 
Senator Charles Sumner2
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The breathtaking growth of international criminal law over the past decade has 
resulted in the prosecution of Balkan and Rwandan mass murderers, the development of a 
substantial body of atrocity law jurisprudence and the creation of a permanent 
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.  The growth of international criminal procedure, unfortunately, has not 
kept pace.  Among its shortcomings, critics have pointed to lengthy pre-trial detention 
without a real possibility of provisional release, the use of affidavits and transcripts 
instead of live witnesses at trial, the absence of juries, and the right of prosecutorial 
appeal.  Given the substantive law advances, why is international criminal procedure 
lagging behind?  Why has it failed to achieve the level of due process offered by the most 
rights-protective countries, such as the United States?  Are there long-term structural 
limits to the growth of international criminal procedure?  Neither the framers of the new 
international tribunals nor the academic commentators have attempted to answer these 
questions in a systematic or comprehensive way. 
 
This Article will attempt to do so.  It begins with the premise that, in the fertile 
human rights soil of international criminal law,3 a procedural scheme nourished on 
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 1 In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 2 Worldofquotes.com, http://www.worldofquotes.com/topic/Compromise/index.html (last visited Sept. 
4, 2006).  
 3 Since they are meant to redress grave violations of human rights, the “extension to international 
criminal proceedings of international human rights provisions of due process,” SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ,
2fundamental notions of due process has at least taken root.4 Its growth has been slow but 
steady.  From the bare-bones privileges afforded defendants at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, to the more fleshed-out protections of the ad hoc Yugoslav and 
Rwanda tribunals, to the recent refinements of the International Criminal Court, the rights 
of the accused in the international criminal dock have most certainly expanded.5 As 
noted above, however, they have only gone so far.6
To understand why, it is instructive to consider the criminal procedure framework 
of sovereign countries, such as the United States.  These entities possess legal and 
physical characteristics conducive to relatively uniform and effective enforcement of a 
criminal defendant’s due process rights.  For example, nation-states rely on their own 
internal enforcement mechanisms to insure compliance with policy directives and rules.7
The latter, for their part, are established pursuant to the overarching norms of a 
homogenous legal paradigm (for example, a common law adversarial system or a civil 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 7 (2003), can be seen as a logical and 
salutary result.  In addition to lending the proceedings moral and institutional coherence, such an extension 
helps spare war-torn populations the ordeal of domestic criminal justice wielded as an instrument of 
vengeance.  Id. at 6.  At the same time, respect for due process may serve as a model and inspiration for 
those populations as they attempt, in the aftermath of international criminal prosecution, to reconstruct 
what is left of their own ravaged justice infrastructure.  See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: 
A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59-AUT LCPR 127, 147 
(1996).  With respect to States, whose cooperation is essential to the success of international tribunals, the 
due process regime permits them to execute the requests of the tribunals while complying with their own 
internally and externally imposed human rights obligations.  Zappalà, supra, at 6.  
 4 See generally Christian Defrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2001).  See also Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Proceedings and the 
Protection of Human Rights, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 935, 936 (2003) (“Human rights ‘enter’ the legal 
framework of the Tribunals in a number of ways.  The most direct application of human rights law 
constitutes the rights explicitly set out in the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”).  
 5 See Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1381.  See also Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C.J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 407 (2001); Patricia M. Wald, Trying War Crimes in International Courts, 31 INT’L 
J. LEGAL INFO. 278 (2003) (noting that the recent ICC rules of procedure represent a “significant 
improvement” over its predecessors). 
 6 The criminal procedure problems identified above -- lengthy pre-trial detention without a real 
possibility of provisional release, the use of affidavits and transcripts instead of live witnesses at trial, the 
absence of juries, and the right of prosecutorial appeal -- as well as others identified infra, are not explicitly 
enjoined by “international due process,” an accretion of norms derived from international and regional 
treaties as well as the jurisprudence of international courts.  See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 586-87 (2003).  In a magisterial undertaking, Professor Bassiouni has set 
out these individual norms and their sources.  Id. at 591-626.  Although these norms “reflect the 
adversary/accusatorial  model of criminal justice,” id., and represent significant progress in the evolution of 
international due process, they do not reach the level of protection found in the most rights-protective 
systems, such as the United States.  See Shane B. Kelbley, Reason Without Borders: How Transnational 
Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1595, 1628 (2005) (“[With respect to criminal 
procedure] the United States is . . . one of the most rights-protective Nations in the world.”).  The advanced 
protections in those systems, particularly the United States, will be the normative point of repair for this 
Article.  They will serve as a conceptual reference to illustrate why the growth of international due process 
has been cabined by the peculiar characteristics of international criminal adjudication.               
 7 See Shabtai Rosenne, Poor Drafting and Imperfect Organization: Flaws to Overcome in the Rome 
Statute, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 164, 181 (2000).  
3law inquisitorial tradition).8 And while these entities deal with prosecuting large-scale, 
serious crimes, they are rarely, if ever, called upon to confront the kind of widespread 
mass murder and extreme violence that rises to the level of genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.     
 
International criminal tribunals and courts are not so fortunate.9 For the most 
part, they depend on external agents (i.e., States) to search for and collect evidence, 
apprehend suspects, and surrender them to the tribunals.10 There is only so much control 
they can wield over States in this regard.  In some cases, where tribunal and State might 
otherwise be in accord, national security concerns may hinder State cooperation.11 
Moreover, even if tribunals were self-sufficient with respect to enforcement, they are 
forced to compromise internally regarding procedural matters.  This is so because each 
international tribunal must harmonize the imperatives of two different, often conflicting 
legal systems – the common law and the civil law.12 Certain due process rights are 
unfortunately sacrificed on the altar of this artificial union.13 Finally, international 
criminal tribunals are not established to handle garden-variety crime.  To the contrary, 
they exist to prosecute the most heinous crimes ever committed – genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.14 When weighed against the gravity of these horrific 
offenses, the otherwise compelling mandate to enforce criminal procedure protections 
may lose some of its urgency. 
 
In the context of these considerations, this Article will attempt a comprehensive, 
structural explanation of the competing forces at work behind the development of due 
 
8 See id.
9 See  Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 589 (“International adjudication also presents unique problems that 
are unknown to national legal systems in that the former relies on the voluntary cooperation of states, while 
the latter benefits from the vertical authoritative process that exists in domestic legal orders.”). 
 10 See GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF
EVIDENCE: OBLIGATION OF STATES 6-7 (2002).  
 11 See generally HERWIG ROGGEMANN & PETAR ŠARVEVIW, NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002). 
 12 See Christoph Safferling, TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-2 (2001) (referring 
to the “wide gap between the Anglo-American and the Continental traditions of criminal procedure.”). 
 13 See Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 840, 
868 (2002) (“Although each of these systems [the common law and the civil law] works well enough in its 
own context, and on its own terms, they do not mix well together.”); Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace 
by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of Considering Discrepancies between the Civil and 
Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 391 (2002) (The distinction is especially apparent when civil and common law traditions are 
contrasted because “between [those] two systems, cultural, economic, and political factors have created 
individuals with attitudes and very distinct points of view about the legal norms that should regulate our 
conduct.”).  
 14 See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21-22 (2003); Theresa Marie Clark, Transplant Justice?: The Efficacy 
of a Purely Common Law Concept in the International Criminal Forum, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75, 
109 (2003) (“The international community established the ICTY and ICTR primarily to hold accountable 
those guilty of the most heinous crimes known to humankind.”); Erin L. Borg, Sharing the Blame for 
September Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to Regulate the Activities of American Corporations Abroad,
20 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 607, 636 (2003) (“The ICC has jurisdiction over the world’s criminals that 
commit the most heinous of crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”).   
4process in international criminal procedure.15 On one hand, Part II will trace the growth 
of international criminal procedure from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court.  
It will show that the advances in extending due process protections parallel the growth of 
human rights law globally and, to a certain extent, criminal procedure in the United 
States.  On the other hand, Part III will explore the forces checking the due process 
expansion of international criminal procedure.  It will focus on three separate phenomena 
as contributing to this restriction: (1) fragmentation of enforcement; (2) integration of 
conflicting legal systems; and (3) gravity of the crimes involved.  The interaction of these 
three restricting phenomena will then be analyzed.  Finally, Part IV will examine the 
impact these forces may have on the future development of due process in international 
criminal procedure.  In the end, the Article will conclude that any future growth of due 
process will hinge on efforts to achieve greater degrees of structural globalization, 
procedural hybridization, and transnational public awareness. 
 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
 
A. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
The genesis of modern international criminal justice traces back to the end of 
World War II with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg16 (“IMT”).17 After the Allied victory in 1945, France, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and the Soviet Union met in London and established an agreement 
(commonly referred to as the “London Agreement”) for the creation of the IMT.18 On 
 
15 In general, experts have classified justice systems into three separate categories: domestic legal 
justice, international criminal justice, and “hybrid” criminal justice, a term used to describe newly emerging 
forms of mixed national-international criminal adjudication as found in, for example, the Sierra Leone and 
proposed Cambodia tribunals.  See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 455-56 
(2003).  As specific domestic structures are grafted onto “hybrid” criminal procedure, Cassese, id. at 456-
57, this Article will not include analysis of them within its scope.   For purposes of this Article, the term 
“international criminal procedure” is meant to encompass the rules developed by the following truly 
international courts (i.e., in addition to having multinational traits, not being moored to one specific 
domestic tradition): the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (and, given its great similarity to the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the 
International Criminal Court.   
 16 An equally important and contemporaneous development was the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) or Tokyo Tribunal for the prosecution of Imperial Japanese war 
criminals in connection with World War II-related offenses.  Section III of the Charter of this Tribunal 
dealt with the issue of fair trial.  Since “the provisions of this section were similar to those contained in the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,” Zappalà, supra note 3, at 20 (2003), this Article will not undertake a 
separate analysis of the criminal procedure elements of the IMTFE.  See also Cassese, supra note 15, at 332 
(“By and large, the Tokyo Charter was modeled on the Nuremberg Charter.”). 
 17 See Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Law and the Cambodian Killing Fields, 3 ILSA J.  
INT’L & COMP. L. 705 (noting that with Nuremberg begins the recognition that certain crimes are of 
universal concern and become the world’s responsibility); Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome: 
Establishing an International Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 299, 300 (2001); Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 413.  
 18 Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945 
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES 
5August 8, 1945, the Charter of the IMT (“Nuremberg Charter” – attached to the London 
Agreement) was signed.19 The Charter mandated that each of the four victorious allied 
powers appoint one judge and one of four chief prosecutors.20 Pursuant to Articles 13 
and 14 of the Charter, the Tribunal was to draft rules of procedure for review and 
approval by a committee of the chief prosecutors.21 The approved Rules of Procedure 
were then included in the Charter.22 
The Charter and the Rules of Procedure yielded a skeletal set of due process 
guarantees for the Nuremberg defendants: 
 
(1) At a reasonable time before trial, the right to be furnished with the 
indictment, and all supporting documents lodged with the indictment, 
as well as the Charter, an explanation of the right to counsel (listed 
below), and a list of defense counsel, in a language which the accused 
understands; 
 
(2) During any preliminary examination or trial, the right of the accused to 
give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; 
 
(3) The right to have the proceedings conducted in or translated into a 
language the accused understands;  
 
(4) The right of the accused to conduct his own defense or have assistance 
of counsel; and 
 
(5) The right, through himself or through his counsel, to present evidence 
at trial in support of his defense and to cross-examine any witness 
called by the prosecution.23 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 420-29 (1949). See also 
Rancilio, supra note 17, at 300; Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the 
Nuremberg Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 523 (2001).   
 19 Id. The London Agreement stated in Article 2 that “The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of 
the International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which 
Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement.”  London Agreement of August 8, 1945 at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/itm/proc/imtchart.htm. 
 20 Michael P. Scharf, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES 
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 10 (1997). 
21 Id. at 7. 
 22 See Howard S. Levie, War Crimes in the Persian Gulf, 1996 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC 
L.J. 153, 157 (1996). 
 23 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 18, art. 16; Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Rules of 
Procedure at http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtrules.htm.  See also Rancilio, supra note 17, 
at 303.   Other provisions in the Charter, which imposed certain duties on the IMT, had the indirect effect 
of protecting defendants’ due process rights.  For example, pursuant to Article 17, the IMT was accorded 
powers such as the authority to summon witnesses, to order the production of documents or other 
evidentiary materials, or to appoint court officers for the purpose of collecting evidence.  Nuremberg 
Charter, supra note 18, art. 17.  Professor Zappalà points out, however, that these powers may not have 
contributed toward a fair trial as they were not exercised in favor of the defense.  See Zappalà, supra note 3, 
at 19-20. 
6This nascent form of international criminal procedure has been criticized as 
fundamentally unfair.24 At least part of the criticism stems from the Tribunal’s attempts 
to incorporate civil law features into the proceedings.  “The general historical consensus 
accepts the thesis that the Nuremberg Charter, its resulting rules of procedure and 
evidence, and those of the courts that followed in its wake, were the result of a 
compromise ‘blending and balancing elements of the Continental European inquisitorial 
system and the Anglo-American adversarial system.’”25 This would have tended to dilute 
due process protections because “it is generally recognized that the adversarial system is 
more suitable when in comes to offering protection to the rights of the accused.”26 By 
and large, under the civil law “inquisitorial” system, most of the documentary and 
testimonial evidence is presented to an examining magistrate who assembles it in a 
dossier.27 Copies of the magistrate’s dossier are provided to the defendant and to the 
court prior to trial.28 The court, either on its own motion or at the request of one of the 
parties, can question witnesses directly.  Moreover, in contrast with the adversarial 
system, cross-examination by opposing counsel is rare.29 As Professor Salvatore Zappalà 
explains: 
 
Generally speaking it may be recalled that these models 
historically reflect different conceptions of ‘judicial truth.’  The 
inquisitorial perspective generally considers that the objective of 
the criminal process is ascertaining the truth; this is and should be 
the overriding concern of the rules of criminal procedure.  These 
rules must enable the ‘inquisitor’ to extract the truth from the 
suspect.  On the other hand, from an accusatorial viewpoint the 
process per se is what really matters.  The establishment of 
historical truth cannot be ensured other than through respect for 
procedural rules, which constitute the method for reaching ‘judicial 
truth.’  In the end, this differentiation reflects two opposing 
epistemological beliefs: while for the inquisitorial paradigm there 
is an objective truth that the ‘inquisitor’ must ascertain, for the 
 
24 See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 
2037 (1998) (“Prominent critics complain that the Nuremberg and Tokyo processes were tainted by 
“victor’s justice,” including procedures and verdicts that were unfair to the defendants.”); Bassiouni, supra 
note  6, at 408 (“By contemporary standards, however, the procedural rights afforded the defendants were 
quite limited.”); KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 98-99 (1997) (faulting Nuremberg for inadequate procedural safeguards). 
 25 Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: 
Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 854 
(1999) (quoting Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7-8 (1995)).  See also Caianiello & Illuminati, supra 
note 5, at 414 (“The Nuremberg Charter and Rules of Procedure tried to blend and balance elements of the 
Continental European system, which is primarily inquisitorial, and the Anglo-American adversarial 
system.”). 
 26 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 16.  
 27 Scharf, supra note 20, at 6.  
 28 Id. at 6-7.  
 29 Id.
7accusatorial approach the truth is the natural and logical result of a 
pre-determined process.30 
According to Professor Antonio Cassese, the upshot of this is that the Continental 
system is “more geared toward the protection of the interests of society…” (i.e.,
providing for expeditious hearings and preventing delays).31 The Anglo-American 
approach, on the other hand, is “bent on enhancing the rights of the accused and more 
generally on ensuring respect for the fundamentals of ‘due process.’”32 
In the specific case of the IMT, the inquisitorial influence meant that, instead of 
live testimony subject to cross-examination, a large number of affidavits and depositions 
were admitted into evidence, preventing the accused from confronting witnesses in open 
court.33 Moreover, the proceedings have been described as “trial by ambush” – i.e.,
proceedings overly expedited (in the spirit of the Continental system)34 given the 
enormity of the charges, the volume of the evidence and the novelty of the procedure and 
rules for the defense attorneys.35 
Other civil law influences, not necessarily written into the Charter, contributed 
toward eroding the rights of the accused.36 In the first place, when the prosecution did 
offer live testimony, civil law-trained defense counsel failed to interpose objections or 
conduct effective cross-examination.37 Furthermore, the conditions and resources 
available for the defense to undertake independent investigations, an essential component 
of protecting the defendant’s rights in the adversarial model, were not adequate.38 Even 
if they were, most of the civil law defense attorneys, accustomed as they were to a 
magistrate taking the investigative laboring oar, could not grasp the importance of 
 
30 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 16. 
 31 Cassese, supra note 15, at 383 (emphasis in original). 
32 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 33 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 18; Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037.  See also Michael P. Scharf, Have 
We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg, 149 MIL. L. REV. 65, 69 (1995) (“The Nuremberg Tribunal 
has been severely criticized for allowing the prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused 
over the objections of their attorneys.  Such affidavits, it has been argued, seriously undermined the 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him.”). 
 34 See Cassese, supra note 15, at 383.  On the flip side, there was certainly no deprivation of the right to 
a speedy trial. 
 35 See Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037.  On the other hand, certain civil law Charter provisions arguably 
strengthened the rights of the accused.  For example, contrary to the prevailing Anglo-American practice, 
the Charter permitted defendants to make unsworn statements on their own behalf at the end of the trial.  
See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 415.  Similarly, the Charter required, inconsistent with 
standard common law rules, that the indictment detail the specific charges against the defendants and 
include any supporting documents.  Id.
36 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21 (“Two issues, however, must be distinguished: on the one hand, the 
question of the fairness of the rules of procedure in abstract; on the other, their concrete application which 
allegedly led to the substantial unfairness of the trials.  It has been argued that the Rules were theoretically 
adequate to give the defendants a fair trial and that it was in fact their application that was unfair.”). 
 37 See Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037. 
 38 Id.
8conducting such investigations.39 Finally, abhorrent to common law notions of due 
process but permissible in the civil law tradition, the IMT allowed for in absentia trials.40 
These were not the only shortcomings.   In the first place, there were absolutely 
no due process safeguards for suspects during the investigation phase of the 
proceedings.41 Protections were lacking at all other stages as well.  For example, there 
was no express rule on the presumption of innocence42 or the duty of the prosecutor to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused.43 There was no right to remain silent, or a 
right to provisional release.44 There was no double jeopardy protection.45 More 
importantly, there was no right to appeal.46 
Apart from the inquisitorial influence, why were such fundamental safeguards 
lacking?47 Many reasons may be discerned but certain ones stand out.  The “heinous 
character” of the crimes “meant that an in-depth and thorough reflection on the protection 
of the rights of persons accused of crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and 
war crimes was not easy.”48 Another equally apparent explanation is “the haste with 
which the victors set up the Tribunals after having considered various options for dealing 
with such novel, widespread, and large-scale crimes, allegedly committed not only by 
servicemen in the field, but also by military and political leaders, as well as civilians 
(such as industrialists, etc.).”49 
39 Id.
40 For example, Martin Bormann, Nazi Party Chancellery Head Secretary and Private Secretary to 
Adolph Hitler, was tried in absentia and found guilty.  See Bush, supra note 18, at 536. 
 41 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 45. 
 42 See Zappalà, id. note 3, at 21.  However, in practice, a presumption of innocence and beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt burden of proof for the prosecution obtained.   Although this is not spelled out in the 
Charter, it is reflected in the IMT’s written decisions.  See, e.g. Hjalmar Schacht Decision [hereinafter 
“Schacht Decision”], IMT Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946 reprinted in THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG 
GERMANY 551-55 (1946) (“The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did in 
fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans. . .  The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with 
great care, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has not been established ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’”  Id. at 554-55. 
 43 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21. 
 44 See id.
45 Indeed, the Nuremberg Charter expressly stated that any person convicted by the IMT could be 
charged subsequently by a national court for any crime other than membership in a criminal organization.  
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 18, art. 11.  In fact, three Nuremberg defendants who were acquitted -- 
Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Fritzsche, and Franz von Papen -- were subsequently prosecuted in German courts.  
See Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War 
Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 58, (1995). 
 46 Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 Fordham Int’l L. J. 
531, 539 (1997) (“The Nuremberg Tribunal could and did impose the death penalty, and there was no right 
of appeal.”).  
 47 It should be noted that perhaps the most frequent criticism lodged against the IMT was that it violated 
the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege, which roughly translates to “no crime or 
punishment for conduct is allowed without the previous existence of a law prohibiting that conduct and 
providing for that punishment.”  See Cassese, supra note 15, at 70-72.    
 48 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21-22.  
 49 Id. at 21.  
9Perhaps less obvious to contemporary students of criminal justice is the fact that 
many of the procedural protections we take for granted today were simply not available 
in 1945.   In the first place, the birth of the modern human rights movement, which 
spawned the due process guarantees to which Western democracies are now so 
accustomed, dates back only to the years after the Second World War ended.50 Thus, the 
Nuremberg Charter would not have incorporated them as a normative point of repair.  
Professor Zappalà points out that “most international standards relating to the protection 
of fundamental rights in the administration of criminal justice had not yet been the object 
of international law-making.”51 
Only in 1948 does an incipient form of international human rights law begin to 
emerge.  On December 8 of that year, the General Assembly of the young United Nations 
agreed on a Resolution that is known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).52 Within this pioneering document, Articles 9 (right not to be exposed to 
arbitrary arrest), 53 10 (right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal)54 and 11 (right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and prohibition 
against ex post facto laws)55 limn the traits of a nascent, but non-binding, criminal 
procedure.56 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which 
gave teeth to and expanded the UDHR due process protections, was not even signed until 
nearly twenty years later, in 1966.57 The ICCPR did not enter into force for another ten 
years.58 
50 See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human Rights Law, C399 
ALI-ABA 1, 7-9 (1989) (“[M]ost observers regard the formation of the United Nations and the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the beginning of the modern struggle to 
protect human rights. . . Modern international human rights law arose in the 1940s.”).  See also Jeffrey A. 
Brauch, Why a Journal of International Law at Regent University School of Law, 1 REGENT J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 
(2003) (“Although the human rights movement has historical antecedents, the current movement took 
shape largely in response to atrocities committed just prior to and during World War II.”). 
 51 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 46. 
 52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), UN Doc. 
A/810, at 71(1948).  
 53 Id. art. 9. 
 54 Id. art. 10. 
 55 Id. art. 11. 
 56 See Safferling, supra note 12, at 22 (“This document [the UDHR] has never gained binding effect on 
the Member States of the UN.”). 
 57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A-6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter 
ICCPR].   ICCPR Articles 9 and 10 prohibit arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.  Articles 14 and 15 provide 
for the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the prohibition of ex post facto laws.  The key 
Article on the rights of persons accused in criminal proceedings is Article 14.  This Article, much more 
detailed than the corresponding provisions of the UDHR, details a panoply of minimum fair trial guarantees 
for the accused in Paragraph 3 of Article 14.  These include: the right to be informed of the charges, the 
right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense, the right to be tried without 
undue delay, the right to legal assistance, the right to examine witnesses and obtain their attendance, the 
right to have an interpreter, and the privilege against self-incrimination.   See Brenda Sue Thornton, The 
New International Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick,
58 ALB. L. REV. 725, 734 n.64 (1995).   
 58 Thornton, supra note 57, at 734. 
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These gradual international developments were mirrored by comparable regional 
efforts during the same time period.  Among these is the European Convention on Human 
Rights (EHCR), which entered into force in 1950,59 and contains criminal procedure 
fairness guarantees, primarily in Articles 6 (prohibiting ex post facto laws) and 7 
(providing for a fair trial).60 In the Americas, Article 26 of the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man (1948)61 and Article 8 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969)62 also embody comparable fair trial protections.  Finally, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)63 ensures fair trial rights in its Article 7. 
 
In the United States, the pantheon of landmark Warren Court rulings that ushered 
in the criminal procedure “due process revolution of the 1960’s,”64 post-dated the 
Nuremberg Charter by nearly two decades.  These cases, and the principles they enshrine, 
now seemingly ingrained in our judicial fabric, were simply not part of the criminal 
procedure lexicon of the Nuremberg architects.65 These ground-breaking precedents 
include: Wong-Sun v. United States66 (evidence that is “the fruit of the poisonous tree” 
must be excluded); Gideon v. Wainwright67(indigent defendant has right to be provided at 
trial with counsel at state’s expense)68; Brady v. Maryland69 (prosecutor has duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense); Massiah v. United States70 (restrictions on 
post-indictment interrogations); Miranda v. Arizona71(certain warnings required before 
police may interrogate a suspect in custody); Chapman v. California72 (infraction of basic 
 
59 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5, art. 3 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).   This Convention is 
enforced through the issuance of legally binding decisions through the European Court of Human Rights – 
the Convention’s “functioning supervisory machinery.”  Safferling, supra note 12, at 23.  
 60 Safferling, supra note 12, at 23.    
 61 American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. 
L./V/II. 23. Doc. 21, rev. 6 (English 1979).   
 62 American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, 
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V/II. 23. Doc. 21, rev. 2 (English 1979).   
 63 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986.  
 64 Bush, supra note 18, at 515.  Zappalà, supra note 3, 46 n.50 (“In this respect it has also been clarified 
that in 1945, even the US Supreme Court had not yet thoroughly developed its jurisprudence on fair trial 
safeguards.”). 
 65 And this is significant, given the disproportionate American influence in the drafting process.  See 
Bush, supra note 18, at 519, 538.  See also Cassese, supra note 15, at 353 (“This scheme [the IMT structure 
and rules] was first drawn up in 1944 by an American officer . . . refined by other staff, subsequently 
upheld by the US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and finally accepted by the other three Great Powers 
in London in 1945.”). 
 66 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  
 67 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 68 It should be noted that at the time of Nuremberg, the United States Supreme Court had interpreted 
due process as ensuring counsel to all defendants in capital cases, which the Nuremberg cases also were.  
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 69 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 70 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 71 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 72 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  
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rights may not be treated as harmless error); United States v. Wade73, Gilbert v. 
California74, Stovall v. Denno75 (mandated procedures to minimize mistaken 
identification); Bruton v. United States76 (admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s 
confession denies defendant his rights under the Confrontation Clause); Duncan v. 
Louisiana77 and Baldwin v. New York78 (jury trial required where possible penalty 
exceeds six months’ imprisonment); and Terry v. Ohio79 (prerequisite to “stop-and-frisk” 
is reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity).  
 
Thus, when viewed in the proper chronological context, the predominantly 
American drafters of the Nuremberg Charter might be said to have “held themselves to so 
much a higher legal standard . . .when federal courts at home took only infrequent steps 
to insure the fairness of state investigatory and trial practices . . .”80 Exceeding the 
protections already contemplated explicitly in the text of its Charter, the IMT provided in 
practice for a presumption of innocence,81 a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of 
proof,82 and a prohibition against trying mentally incompetent defendants.83 It also 
permitted defendants, upon motion, to examine documentary evidence in the hands of 
occupation authorities; “in effect given access to the prosecution’s principal source of 
evidence.”84 In fact, within the relative criminal procedure vacuum of 1945, 
Nuremberg’s fledgling due process standards are considered by some to have adequately 
“paid respect to the rights of the accused.”85 Considering “the atrocities that had taken 
place and the suffering that was involved,” these commentators conclude that the 
Nuremberg procedure was fundamentally “fair.”86 In fact, Professor Zappalà concludes: 
“It is very difficult to deny that under those circumstances it was difficult to conduct a 
 
73 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 74 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
 75 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 76 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 77 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 78 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
 79 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 80 Bush, supra note 18, at 537. 
 81 See, e.g., the Schacht Decision, supra note 42, at 555; Bush, supra note 18, at 531-32.  Likewise, 
Professor Zappalà observes that “although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters did not explicitly recognize 
the presumption of innocence, it may be argued that it was accepted de facto. Indeed, Robert Jackson, the 
US Prosecutor at the [IMT], conceded that ‘we accept that [the defendants] must be given a presumption of 
innocence.’”  Zappalà, supra note 3, at 84. 
 82 See, e.g., the Schacht Decision, supra note 42, at 555; Bush, supra note 18, at 531-32. 
 83 Bush, supra note 18, at 532-33.  Bush cites to the example of the notorious Nazi industrialist Gustav 
Krupp.  On the eve of trial, Krupp was found to be mentally incompetent.  Over the strenuous objections of 
the prosecution, Krupp’s case was severed.  Id.
84 Bush, supra note 18, at 528.   
 85 See, e.g., Safferling, supra note 12, at 22.  Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 407-08 (“The legal 
amalgamation, according to Justice Jackson, worked to the advantage of the defendants in that they could, 
for example, take the stand and testify under oath in their own defense or simply present an unsworn 
statement to the court at the end of a trial without submitting to cross-examination.”).  
 86 Id. See also Bush, supra note 18, at 528.  Bush points as well to Nuremberg’s acquittals, such as the 
not-guilty verdict of former German Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht (see Schacht Decision, supra note 
42, at 555) as further proof of its inherent fairness.  Bush, supra note 18, at 528.    
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fairer trial.”87 These observations seem to vindicate Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson’s 
oft-quoted opening that certainly paid obeisance to due process: 
 
There is a dramatic disparity between the circumstances of 
the accusers and the accused that might discredit our work 
if we should falter in even minor matters, in being fair and 
temperate . . . We must never forget that the record on 
which we judge these defendants is the record on which 
history will judge us tomorrow.  To pass these defendants a 
poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well.  We must 
summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our 
task that this trial will commend itself to posterity as 
fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.88 
As demonstrated above, in Nuremberg’s wake, and perhaps partly because of 
Nuremberg, an international due process revolution would soon take place.  The 
achievements of that revolution would be reflected in the next phase of developing an 
international criminal procedure: the advent of the ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
 
B. The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
 
After the global conflagration that gave rise to Nuremberg, the Cold War had an 
extreme chilling effect on the growth of international criminal law.89 With the end of bi-
polar hostilities in the early 1990s, though, ethnic tensions, which had been quelled in 
certain parts of the world during the hegemonic post-War years, began bubbling to the 
surface.  In the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda they exploded into “ethnic cleansing” 
and genocide.90 
In February 1993, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security 
Council declared that ethnic atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia constituted “a 
threat to international peace,” and that the establishment of an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal would “contribute to the restoration of peace.”91 As a result, the 
Security Council directed the Secretary-General to prepare a report setting out the 
necessary details for implementing its decision to create a tribunal.92 On May 8, 1993, 
the Secretary-General submitted the requested report to the Security Council with a 
proposed Statute for a tribunal.93 On May 25, 1993, the Security Council created the 
 
87 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 46 n. 49.  
 88 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 101 
(1949). See also Christensen, supra note 13, at 394.  
 89 See Cassese, supra note 15, at 334.  
 90 Id. at 335. 
 91 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 317th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). 
 92 Id.
93 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General], U.N. Doc. S/2504 (1993), 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) by adopting the 
proposed Statute.94 
Soon thereafter, the Security Council responded in a similar way to the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda.  Once again acting under its Chapter VII powers, it created the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) by Resolution 955 of November 8, 
1994.95 The ICTR is governed by its Statute, which is annexed to Security Council 
Resolution 955.96 
The ICTY adopted its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) on February 11, 
1994.  The rules came into force on March 14, 1994.97 The ICTY acted pursuant to 
Article 15 of its Statute mandating it to adopt “rules of procedure and evidence for the 
conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of 
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses, and other appropriate matters.”98 
Similarly, in accord with Article 14 of its Statute, the ICTR adopted its own RPE, which 
became effective on June 29, 1995 [hereinafter ICTR RPE].99 
In terms of human rights, the world in which these RPEs were formulated bore 
little resemblance to that of 1945, when a new international criminal procedure was cut 
out of whole cloth for Nuremberg.  As one commentator has observed: “…fifty years 
have elapsed since the Nuremberg prosecutions began and human wisdom has become 
increasingly conscious of the prohibitions against violating fundamental human 
rights…”100 By the 1990s, that knowledge had inspired the globe to embrace a plethora of 
human rights instruments in addition to the ones already discussed above, including, inter 
alia: the Geneva Conventions,101 the Genocide Convention,102 the Convention Against 
 
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163.  The annex to this Report contains the Statute of the tribunal.  Id., Annex at 36, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192.  
 94 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 
I.L.M. 1203, 1204 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].  
 95 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at  1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
 96 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., Annex, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].  
 97 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994) [herinafter ICTY RPE].  
 98 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 84. 
 99 The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter ICTR RPE] “do not carry a UN document 
number.”  Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 589, 609 n.100 (2001).  
 100 Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights and Self-Determination: The Meaning of 
International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1477, 1489 (2001).  
 101 Four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3217, 
3316, 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
 102 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered 
into force Jan. 12, 1951. 
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Torture,103 the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination,104 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child,105 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 106 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.107 
These treaties, and the strengthening of human rights they embodied, presaged an 
expansion of due process guarantees for defendants at the two ad hoc Tribunals.  As one 
commentator has noted: 
 
One of the most fundamental principles of human rights, as 
stated above, ‘is the protection of individual liberty, 
especially from the undue exercise of state power.’  This 
principle is also applicable at the international level and the 
concern for personal liberty is reflected in the Statutes of 
the ICTY and ICTR and their Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  These instruments limit the extent to which 
persons may be deprived of their liberty before they are 
brought to trial and set out rules aimed at preventing the 
innocent from being convicted and imprisoned by 
protecting the integrity of the trial itself.108 
Accordingly, the due process advances of the two ad hoc Tribunals may be 
gleaned from a distillation of their structures and rules.  Since the ICTR “adopted most 
rules of [the] ICTY without major amendment,”109 this section of the Article will focus 
on the ICTY’s structure and rules.110 
103 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 113, entered into force June 26, 1987.   
 104 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 
4, 1969.  
 105 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.  
 106 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 
entered into force Sept. 3, 1981. 
 107 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 
Jan. 3, 1976.  
 108 Stuart Beresford, Redressing the Wrongs of the International Justice System: Compensation for 
Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 628, 
631 (2002). 
 109 Catherine Cissé, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some 
Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 116 (1997).  
 110 At the time the ICTR RPE was adopted, the only noteworthy difference between it and the ICTY 
RPE related to the rule on provisional measures during investigations.  ICTR RPE Rule 40 permitted the 
Prosecutor  “upon showing that a major impediment does not allow the State to keep the Suspect under 
provisional detention … apply to a Judge … for an order to transfer the suspect to the seat of the Tribunal 
… and to detain him there provisionally.  [Thereafter the] suspect shall be released if: i) the Chamber so 
rules, or ii) the Prosecutor fails to issue an indictment within twenty days of the transfer.”  ICTR RPE, 
supra note 99, R. 40 (1995).  See Cissé, supra note 109, at 116-17.  This exception to the rule of non-
detention was not subsequently expanded in Rule 40 of the ICTY.  Id.
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1. Structure  
 
The organizational chart of the ICTY can be divided into three principal 
functions: adjudicative, prosecutorial and administrative.111 These respective functions 
are assigned to three principal and separate organs: (1) the Chambers (including three 
Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber), (2) the Prosecutor and (3) the Registry.112 
The Registry, which is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the 
ICTY, serves both the Prosecutor and the Chambers.113 Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
the ICTY (and ICTR, for that matter) is truly international -- prosecutors, judges and 
members of the registry come from countries around the world.114 
Of these three ICTY organs, the Office of the Prosecutor plays perhaps the most 
significant role in determining the Tribunal’s agenda.  It is tasked with investigating, 
preparing indictments, and trying alleged criminals.115 The Prosecutor initiates 
investigations ex officio -- in other words, without the review or authorization of any 
other Tribunal organ.116 
2. Procedure 
 
In general, there are six procedural steps in the ICTY’s pre-trial stage.117 First, as 
just described, the Prosecutor initiates the investigation.  During the investigation phase, 
the Prosecutor has the power to question suspects, victims, and witnesses, to collect 
evidence, and to conduct on-site investigations.118 In carrying out these tasks, the 
Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned.119 
ICTY RPE Rule 40 authorizes the Prosecutor to request any State concerned, as a matter 
of urgency: (i) to arrest a suspect provisionally; (ii) to seize physical evidence; and (iii) to 
take all necessary measures to prevent the escape of a suspect or an accused, injury to or 
intimidation of a victim or witness, or the destruction of evidence. 
 
Second, if the Prosecutor determines that a prima facie case exists, she prepares 
an indictment containing a concise statement of facts and crimes with which the accused 
 
111 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 11.  See also Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The 
Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 111, 142 (1998).  
 112 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, arts. 12 - 17. 
 113 Id. art. 17.  
 114 See, e.g., id., art. 12 (“The Chambers shall be composed of sixteen permanent independent judges, 
no two of whom may be nationals of the same State . . .”).  
 115 Id. art. 16. 
 116 Id. art. 18.  
 117 Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which Is the Oxymoron? An 
Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 475, 488 (1995).   
 118 Id.
119 Id.
16
is charged.120 Third, the Prosecutor transmits the indictment to a designated trial 
chamber judge.121 Fourth, the designated trial chamber judge confirms the indictment if  
she agrees that it presents a prima facie case.122 Otherwise, the judge dismisses the 
indictment.123 Fifth, if the indictment is confirmed, at the request of the Prosecutor or sua 
sponte, the judge may issue an arrest warrant for the accused if the accused is not already 
in the ICTY’s custody.124 Finally, after the arrest and transfer of the accused to the 
control of the ICTY, he is brought before a trial chamber judge, “without delay,” for an 
arraignment proceeding, during which a date for trial is scheduled.125 
If the accused pleads guilty, and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the guilty plea 
was informed, made voluntarily, not equivocal, and supported by a sufficient factual 
basis, then the Registrar will set a date for the sentencing hearing.126 
Assuming the accused pleads not guilty, Article 21 of the ICTY Statute provides 
for a “fair” trial and enumerates various requirements to guarantee fairness.  Those 
 
120 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 18.  See also ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R. 47(b).  The ICTY RPE 
replaces the phrase “prima facie case” with the phrase “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds 
for believing that a suspect has committed a crime.”  ICTY RPE, id. R. 47(A).   
 121 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 18.  An indictment may join two or more persons charged with the 
same crime or with different crimes committed in the course of the same transaction.  ICTY RPE, supra 
note 97, R. 48.  It may likewise charge an accused person (or persons) with two or more crimes, if those 
crimes form part of a series of crimes that constitute one transaction and were committed by the same 
accused person (or persons).  Id. R. 49. 
 122 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19(1).  An indictment may be amended without leave at any time 
before its confirmation.  Thereafter, amendment must be by leave of the trial chamber.  ICTY RPE, supra 
note 97, R. 50.  Similarly, an indictment may be withdrawn without leave at any time before its 
confirmation.  After that, it can be withdrawn only with the leave of the judge who confirmed it or, if at 
trial, with leave of the trial chamber.  Id. R. 51.  At the time of confirmation, the confirming judge may, in 
consultation with the prosecutor, order that there be no disclosure of the indictment until it has been served 
on the accused.  Id. R. 53.  Nondisclosure at this stage is intended to ensure that the accused does not, on 
hearing of the indictment, disappear so as to avoid arrest and trial.  Id. R. 53(B).  See also Daniel D. Ntanda 
Nsereko, A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Substantive and 
Procedural Issues, 5 CRIM. L. F. 507, 529 (1994). 
 123 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19 (1).  The dismissal of an indictment or a count does not preclude 
the prosecutor from subsequently bringing a new indictment or count based on the acts underlying that 
indictment or count providing that there is additional evidence to support it.  ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R. 
47(E). 
 124 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19 (2).   See also ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R.R. 54-61.  The 
warrant must be accompanied by a copy of the indictment and a statement of the accused’s rights.  Id., R. 
55(C).  The rights of the accused will be discussed infra. The state authorities to which the warrant is 
transmitted must execute it promptly and diligently.  Id., R. 56.  The local authorities cannot set up their 
national laws or existing treaty obligations as an excuse for not surrendering the accused, since the 
obligations they assume under Article 29 of the Statute [Co-operation and Judicial Assistance] override 
such laws or treaty obligations.  Where the national authorities are unable to execute an arrest warrant, they 
must so report to the Registrar, giving the reasons for their inability.  ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R. 59(A).  
If, after the lapse of a reasonable time, no report is made, “this shall be deemed a failure to execute the 
warrant of arrest” and the Tribunal, through the President, “may notify the Security Council accordingly.”  
Id., R. 59(B).    
 125 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 20; ICTY RPE, supra note 97, art. 62. 
 126 ICTY RPE, supra note 97, art. 62 bis.
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requirements will be discussed infra. The rules provide for preliminary motions,127 a pre-
trial conference,128 and a “pre-defense” conference.129 The trial itself takes place before 
the trial chamber to which the matter has been assigned (i.e., the case is tried to three 
judges).130 The judgment must be rendered by a majority of the judges of the trial 
chamber (i.e., at least two of three) and must be delivered by the trial chamber in 
public.131 It must be accompanied by “a reasonable opinion in writing, to which separate 
or dissenting opinions may be appended.”132 Both the convicted defendant and the 
Prosecutor have the right to appeal the trial chamber’s decisions (based on both errors of 
fact and law).133 The appeals chamber may affirm, reverse, or revise the decisions of the 
trial chamber.134 
3. Rights of the Accused 
 
The post-World War II advances in the due process rights of criminal defendants 
“are an explicit component of the [ICTY]’s legal framework.”135 In his commentary 
regarding procedural issues and the rights of the accused at the time of the Tribunal’s 
creation, the U.N. Secretary-General stated that it “is axiomatic that the International 
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of 
the accused at all stages of its proceedings.”136 In fact, the due process guarantees 
incorporated into the ICTY Statute roughly reflect those found in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR,137 an instrument cited by the Secretary-General as reflective of the 
internationally recognized standards of the rights of criminal defendants.138 These rights 
of the accused, which are “subject” to the provisions of Article 22 (dealing with victim-
witness protection),139 include:  
 
127 ICTY RPE, id. R.R. 72, 73. These motions are brought before a specially designated “Pre-Trial 
Judge” who handles pre-trial issues between the parties, establishes a pre-trial litigation schedule, and 
enforces it.  See id., R. 65 ter.
128 Id. R. 73 bis. This rule requires a conference before a specially designated “Pre-Trial Judge.”  See 
id., R. 65 ter. At the conference, the parties are supposed to discuss the number of witnesses the Prosecutor 
may call, the time available for the Prosecutor to present evidence, and the “number of crime sites or 
incidents in respect of which evidence may be presented . . .” Id. R. 73 bis.
129 Id. R. 73 ter. Pursuant to this rule, prior to the commencement by the defense of its case, the Trial 
Chamber may hold a conference to discuss various matters, including the number of witnesses the defense 
may call and the time granted to the defense to put on its case.  
 130 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, arts. 12 & 23. 
 131 Id. art. 23.  
 132 Id.
133 Id. art. 25. 
 134 Id.
135 Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1393 (2001). 
 136 Secretary-General’s Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the former Yugoslavia, ¶ 106, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. s/25704 (1993), 
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereafter Secretary-General’s Report]. 
 137 ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 21. 
 138 Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 136, ¶ 106. 
 139 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 22, [Protection of victims and witnesses] which declares: “The 
International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.  Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera 
proceedings and the protection of the victim’s identity.” 
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(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which 
he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against 
him; 
 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own 
choosing; 
 
(c) To be tried without undue delay; 
 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person 
or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be 
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; 
and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case 
where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it; 
 
(e)  To examine, or to have examined, the witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; 
 
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in the International 
Tribunal; and  
 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt.140 
The above-enumerated ICCPR Article 14 rights, only referring to “hearings 
before a tribunal,”141 do not paint the entire due process picture at the ICTY because “the 
commencement of investigations can hardly be understood as a hearing before a 
tribunal.”142 Indeed, both the ICTY Statute and RPE contain additional investigative-
phase protections.  Article 18(3) of the Statute provides: “If questioned, the suspect shall 
be entitled to be assisted by counsel of his own choice, including the right to have legal 
assistance assigned to him without payment by him in any such case if he does not have 
 
140 Id. art. 21(4).  Pursuant to Rule 82 of the ICTY RPE [Joint and Separate Trials], in joint trials, each 
accused shall have the same rights as if such accused were being tried separately.  Moreover, the Trial 
Chamber may order that persons accused jointly under Rule 48 be tried separately if it considers it 
necessary “in order to avoid a conflict of interest that might cause serious prejudice to an accused or to 
protect the interests of justice.”  ICTY RPE, supra, note 94, R. 82.   
 141 Safferling, supra note 12, at 56.  
 142 Id.
19
sufficient means to pay for it, as well as to necessary translation into and from a language 
he speaks and understands.”143 
The RPE goes further.  Pursuant to Rule 42, a suspect who is to be questioned by 
the Prosecutor is accorded the following rights, of which the Prosecutor must inform the 
suspect prior to questioning, in a language the suspect understands: 
 
(a) The right to be assisted by counsel of the suspect’s choice 
or to be assigned legal assistance without payment if the 
suspect does not have sufficient means to pay for it; 
 
(b) The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the 
suspect cannot understand or speak the language to be used 
for questioning; and 
 
(c) The right to remain silent, and to be cautioned that any 
statement the suspect makes shall be recorded and may be 
used in evidence.144 
Moreover, questioning of the suspect may not take place without the presence of 
counsel unless the suspect has waived the right to counsel.145 Nevertheless, even in the 
case of waiver, if the suspect subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, the 
Prosecutor must stop the questioning and may resume only when the suspect has obtained 
counsel.146 Finally, whenever a prosecutor questions a suspect, Rule 43 of the RPE 
requires that the session be audio or video-recorded.147 According to Professor 
Christopher Safferling this “is the most effective safeguard against undue pressure from 
the interrogator” and it “enhances the ICTY’s ability to determine whether a statement 
was made voluntarily.” 148 
As a means of enforcing these safeguards, RPE Rule 95 bars admission of any 
evidence “obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability” or whose 
admission would be “antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the 
proceedings.”149 
143 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 18(3). 
 144 ICTY RPE, supra note 94, R. 42(A).    
 145 Id., R. 42(B). 
 146 Id. These custodial interrogation protections are comparable to those afforded defendants in the 
United States Supreme Court decision of Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 71, and its progeny.  See 
Safferling, supra note 12, at 123 n.369 (disagreeing with the notion that the “law at the ICTY deviates from 
the Miranda jurisprudence. . .”).  If anything, the ICTY, as befits an international tribunal, goes above and 
beyond the Miranda protections by providing for the free assistance of an interpreter and the requirement 
that the questioning be recorded (as explained infra).    
147 ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R. 43. 
 148 Safferling, supra note 12, at 130. 
 149 ICTY RPE, supra note 97. R. 94. 
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Other rights are embedded in various articles of the Statute.  For example, 
pursuant to Article 13, the accused has the right to be tried by judges of high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity who possess experience in criminal and international 
law and qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices.150 Article 10 incorporates the principle of “ne bis in idem,” an 
equivalent to the American double jeopardy protection that essentially prevents a person 
from being tried twice for the same crime.151 As for sentencing, in contrast to 
Nuremberg, the ICTY does not permit punishment by death.152 Similarly, also different 
from Nuremberg, it allows defendants to appeal their convictions.153 
C. The International Criminal Court 
 
In a decade whose opening ended the Cold War and ushered in mass internecine 
violence in Europe and Africa and whose middle resuscitated the dormant dreams of 
Nuremberg, it was perhaps fitting that the 1990s should close with the creation of a 
permanent global criminal tribunal.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (“Rome Statute”) was signed on July 17, 1998 at the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”).154 Two years later, the ICC adopted its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.155 
The ICC has been described as “the culmination of five decades of progress 
toward the realization of protection for human rights throughout the world.”156 As a 
result, the ICC represents the most advanced level of protection to date of the rights of 
defendants in international criminal proceedings.157 This growth in due process 
 
150 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 13.  
 151 Id. art. 10.  See Johan van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 286, 342 (1999) (equating ne bis in idem with the double jeopardy protection).  
Nevertheless, a person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting violations of 
international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the ICTY only if: (a) the act for which he was 
tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; and (b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or 
independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was 
not diligently prosecuted.  ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 10.    
 152 See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 24 (providing that any penalty to be imposed by the ICTY shall 
be limited to imprisonment).  
 153 Id. art. 25 (providing for appellate proceedings). 
 154 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 1 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Official Records (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 155 Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (July 2000) [hereinafter ICC RPE].   The 
Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 and the ICC began operating in March 2003. See Dawn 
Yamane Hewitt, Sudan’s Courts and Complementarity in the Face of Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 276, 277 
(2006).  To date, the ICC has pending investigations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and Darfur. Uganda and the DRC are State Parties to the Rome Statute and conferred jurisdiction 
upon the ICC through self-referral. Id. In contrast, the ICC obtained jurisdiction over the Darfur case 
through the U.N. Security Council referral. Id.
156 Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC Debate,
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 169, 171 (2003).  
 157 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 25 & 48 (“It is indisputable that, in the ICC Statute, there has been a clear 
attempt to improve the protection of rights relating to the administration of criminal justice.”).  
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safeguards, however, is not merely an incidental byproduct of a cresting human rights 
trend.  Instead, “for the first time in history, these [ICC criminal procedure] rules were 
adopted by States clearly having in mind that one day these rights might be applicable to 
proceedings instituted against their own citizens.”158 
Nevertheless, rather than re-invent the proverbial wheel, the ICC’s criminal 
procedure takes the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as its 
starting point.  As a result, the ICC incorporates much of the structural and due process 
elements of the ad hoc tribunals.159 Still, to analyze the ICC’s due process expansion vis 
à vis the ad hoc tribunals, its structure, rules and rights should be examined 
independently. 
 
1. Structure 
 
With some slight modifications, the basic organic structure of the ICC largely 
resembles those of the ad hoc Tribunals.160 Article 34 of the Rome Statute states that the 
ICC shall be composed of the following organs: the Presidency, in other words, the 
President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents under Article 38 (comprising the 
main steering committee of the Court); an Appeals Division, a Trial Division, and a Pre-
Trial Division (those four “organs” composing the Court proper); the Office of the 
Prosecutor; and the Registry.161 The Presidency and the various judicial chambers are 
responsible for the Court’s judicial function.  The Office of the Prosecutor carries out the 
ICC’s investigative and prosecutorial functions.  And the Registry is the principal 
administrative organ of the Court.162 
The Statute allows for eighteen full-time judges (including members of the 
Presidency).163 The Appellate Division is composed of the President and four other 
judges, while the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions each require not less than six 
judgeships.164 Each Trial Chamber consists of three judges while each Pre-Trial 
Chamber may consist of three judges or a single judge “in accordance with [the] Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”165 
158 Id.
159 See Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463 (1998) (“. . . the 
rules of procedure and evidence each Tribunal has adopted now form the vital core of an international code 
of criminal procedure and evidence that will doubtless have an important impact on the rules of the future 
international criminal court.”); Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ 
Responsibility to Withdraw from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer 
Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 953 (2004) (“The ICC will have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity and serious war crimes, meaning that it will rely on the procedures, holdings, and lessons of the 
ICTY [and] the ICTR . . .”). 
 160 See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 433 (“The structure of the ICC is similar to that of the 
International Tribunals.”).  
 161 Rome Statute, supra note 154, arts. 34 & 38. 
 162 See Gregory P. Noone & Douglas William Moore, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 112, 124 (1999). 
 163 Rome Statute, supra note 154, arts. 35 & 36.  
 164 Id. art. 39.  
 165 Id.
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The Office of the Prosecutor is primarily responsible for “receiving referrals and 
any substantiated information on crimes” within the ICC’s jurisdiction and “conducting 
investigations and prosecutions before the Court.”166 The Registry, acting under the 
authority of the Presidency, deals with the “non-judicial aspects of the administration and 
servicing of the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the 
Prosecutor.”167 
2. Procedure 
 
Proceedings at the ICC may be initiated in one of three ways.  The first two ways 
consist of (1) the Security Council (acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter) or (2) a State Party referring a crime or crimes to the Prosecutor for 
investigation.168 The third way entails the Prosecutor’s initiating a proceeding “proprio 
motu (i.e., on the Prosecutor’s own motion) on the basis of information on crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.”169 
In the case of investigations initiated by State Parties or proprio motu, as a 
threshold matter, the Prosecutor must first determine whether “there would be a 
reasonable basis to commence an investigation.”170 If the Prosecutor is satisfied that 
there is such a basis, he must notify “all States Parties and those States, which, taking into 
account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned.”171 Only if there is no relevant State criminal investigation/prosecution taking 
place, or if one taking place is clearly “unwilling or unable” to do justice, may the 
Prosecutor initiate investigations proper.172 
In the case of proprio motu initiation, Article 15 requires that a preliminary 
investigation or “inquiry,”173 precede an investigation proper.  The “inquiry” consists of a 
search for information or the gathering of evidence about an alleged crime, for the 
 
166 Id. art. 42.  
 167 Id. art. 43.  
 168 Id. arts. 13 [Security Council and State Party referral] & 14 [State Party referral].   
 169 Id. art. 15.  This means the Prosecutor is acting without the referral or authorization of the Security 
Council or State Parties.  See also id. art. 53 (“Initiation of an Investigation”).     
 170 Id. arts. 18(1) & 53(1).  
 171 Id. art. 18(1).  In case of referral by the Security Council, the Prosecutor may find other means of 
enabling States to become cognizant of the referral and of the possible initiation of court investigations.  
See Cassese, supra note 15, at 408. 
 172 Rome Statute, supra note 154, arts. 17 & 18.  See also Cassese, supra note 15, at 409.   This 
comports with the principle of “complementarity.”  See Safferling, supra note 12, 177.  “Complementarity” 
is defined as “deferral by the ICC to the courts of national jurisdiction of the accused.”  Gerard E. 
O’Connor, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States Should Support the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 948 (1999).  “At the core of 
determining who will have jurisdiction in a particular case, complementarity recognizes that the ICC will 
not supersede or replace national courts, but will rather seek to complement them.  There will be a 
presumption that the Prosecutor will be precluded from taking any action when a state has a functioning 
judicial system.”  Noone & Moore, supra note 162, at 140-41.  
 173 This is the term used by Professor Cassese for purposes of conceptual and procedural clarity.  See 
Cassese, supra note 15, at 407.  
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purpose of establishing if there is “a reasonable basis to proceed with the 
investigation.”174 The Prosecutor bases the initiation of this proprio motu inquiry on any 
relevant information he may have received from any reliable source, as well as “written 
or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.”175 If the Prosecutor establishes that such a 
“reasonable basis” exists, he must submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a “request for 
authorization of an investigation.”176 If the Pre-Trial Chamber grants the request, the 
Prosecutor may commence the investigation.177 
Notwithstanding this authorization, the Security Council, by mere request to the 
Court through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, will obtain a 
twelve-month suspension of any investigation or prosecution, either before its 
commencement or while it is under way.178 Moreover, the Security Council may renew 
such a request under the same conditions.179 
Assuming the investigation goes forward, however, the Prosecutor is not merely 
an adversarial party to the proceedings.  As set forth in Article 54 of the Rome Statute, 
she is bound to search for, gather, and pass on to the defense both incriminating and 
exonerating evidence equally.180 In this sense, the Prosecutor acts as an “organ of 
justice” rather than just an opposing party in a contest.181 
During the investigation, the Prosecutor has no power to take forcible measures 
on the territory of a State.182 This is owing to Article 99 of the Rome Statute, which 
affords the Prosecutor rather limited powers to conduct on-site investigations.183 This 
entails that “intrusive measures, such as searches and seizures will have to be executed by 
the State Party upon request by the ICC.”184 
Once the investigation is initiated, the Prosecutor must apply to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear before the 
Court.185 A State must promptly surrender the designated person to the Court after the 
State’s judiciary determines that the person’s identity matches that of the warrant and all 
 
174 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 15; Cassese, supra note 15, at 407.  
 175 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 15(1). 
 176 Id. art. 15(3).  
 177 Id. art. 15(4).  
 178 Id. art. 16. 
 179 Id.
180 Id. art. 54.  
 181 See Cassese, supra note 15, at 439.  
 182 See Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a 
Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 603, 615 (2003).   This is with the “arguable exception of the 
‘failed state scenario’ under Article 57(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.” Id. Article 57(3) empowers the Pre-
Trial Chamber to authorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the territory of a State 
Party without having secured the cooperation of that State, when the State is clearly unable to execute a 
request for cooperation.  Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 57(3).   
 183 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 99(4). 
 184 Kress, supra note 182, at 615. 
 185 Id. art. 58.  
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corresponding rights have been respected.186 Once the suspect is placed in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s custody, a hearing, in the presence of the suspect and his counsel, is 
conducted to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to try the case.187 
Before the Chamber rules on the sufficiency of evidence to bind the suspect over for trial, 
the suspect is permitted at the hearing to object to the charges, challenge the Prosecutor’s 
evidence, and present his own evidence.188 
During the pre-trial phase, the suspect may apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
“interim release” pending trial.189 Also during this phase, the Prosecutor may amend the 
charges after giving notice to the accused and provided that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
permits the amendment.190 It is also during this phase that the Prosecutor must proceed to 
the disclosure of collected “evidentiary” materials and the defense must disclose certain 
matters to the Prosecution, including the assertion and substance of any alibi defense.191 
Relying on the trial procedures established by the ad hoc Tribunals, “a similar system is 
envisaged for the ICC.”192 
3. Rights of the Suspect and the Accused 
 
The ICC has been described as “explicitly bound by respect for human rights.”193 
Indeed, pursuant to Article 54 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must “fully respect the 
 
186 Id. art. 59.  
 187 Id. art. 61.  The hearing can be held in the absence of the person charged only if he has waived the 
right to be present, or if he has fled or cannot be found, meaning a warrant or a summons was issued having 
no effect.  Id., art 61(2).  If the suspect has fled or cannot be found, all reasonable steps must have been 
taken to secure his appearance and to inform him of the hearing and the charges.  Id. In such cases, the 
absent person may be represented by counsel, but this right is subject to discretionary review by the Pre-
Trial Chamber to determine whether it is in the interest of justice.  Id.
188 Id. If the Chamber declines the charge, the Prosecutor may subsequently request confirmation upon 
the presentation of additional evidence.  Id.
189 Id. art. 60.  The ICC will not grant interim release if it is satisfied that the conditions set forth in art. 
58, paragraph 1 are met.  Under these, detention must be ordered if necessary: (1) to ensure the person’s 
appearance at trial; (2) to ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court 
proceedings; or (3) where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that 
crime, or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same 
circumstances.  “It comes as no surprise that strict conditions govern the interim release applications, 
because they were driven by the fear that detention might too easily be suspended.”  Göran Sluiter, The 
Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV.
605, 623 (2003).  The suspect may similarly apply for interim release, if he can show the absence of the 
same conditions, when in the custody of the State that arrested him (i.e., pre-surrender to the ICC).  See 
Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 59.      
 190 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 61(9).  
 191 ICC RPE Rules 76-84 govern these matters.  ICC RPE, supra, note 155, R.R. 76-84.   
 192 Cassese, supra note 15, at 421.  Under ICC RPE Rule 141(2), “the defense shall always have the 
opportunity to speak last.”  ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 141(2).  Additionally, matters related to 
sentencing must be separately addressed by the parties, before the end of trial, in “additional hearings.”  See 
Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 76; ICC RPE, supra note 155,  R. 143.  The ad hoc Tribunals originally 
had a separate post-trial sentencing phase but this feature was eliminated in July 1998 in the interests of 
streamlining the proceedings .  See Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal 
Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 67 (2001).   
 193 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 43. 
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rights of persons arising under this Statute.”194 Further, Article 21 makes clear that the 
ICC is bound by “principles and rules of international law” and that its interpretation of 
law must be “consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”195 
a. Pre-Trial Rights 
 
During the pre-trial phase, the nomenclature for persons under investigation is 
bifurcated into (1) persons in respect of an investigation; and (2) persons for whom there 
are grounds to believe they committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.196 For 
the former, Paragraph 1 of Article 55 explicitly guarantees the following due process 
protections:  
 
(a)  The right not to incriminate oneself or confess guilt;  
 
(b)  The right not to be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to 
torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment;  
 
(c)  The right to an interpreter and to such translations as are necessary to meet 
the requirements of fairness; and 
 
(d) The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and not to be 
deprived of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established in the Statute.197 
Sub-section (d) above does not specify which “procedures” established in the 
Statute would apply.  However, the grounds for arrest and certain guarantees for persons 
arrested are laid out elsewhere in the Statute.  Article 58, for example, specifies that the 
arrest warrant must contain concise information for the arrested person concerning the 
reasons for the arrest and the crimes allegedly committed.198 Article 58 also specifies the 
grounds on which the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue a warrant of arrest.  In the first place, 
there must be reasonable grounds for believing the person has committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.199 Moreover, the arrest must be necessary to ensure the 
attendance of that person at trial, to prevent obstruction of investigations, and, where 
applicable, to prevent the commission of other related crimes.200 
194 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 54.  
 195 Id. art. 21.  
 196 Id. art. 55.  
 197 Id.
198 Id. art. 58.  
 199 Id.
200 Id.
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One other important arrest-related right must be mentioned.201 Article 85 
provides that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall 
have an enforceable right to compensation.”202 Chapter 10 of the ICC RPE sets out the 
rules and procedures related to this right of compensation.  With respect to determining 
the proper amount of compensation, ICC RPE Rule 175 requires the competent Chamber 
to “take into consideration the consequences which the grave and manifest miscarriage of 
justice has had for the personal, family, social and professional situation of the person 
filing the request.”203 
Rome Statute Article 55, Section 2 enumerates the rights of persons who are 
believed to have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.  Those rights are 
triggered when such persons are “about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by 
national authorities pursuant to a request” made by the Prosecutor.204 They include: 
 
(a) The right to be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds 
to believe the suspect committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; 
 
(b) The right to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in 
the determination of guilt or innocence; 
 
(c) The right to have legal assistance of the suspect’s choosing, or, if the 
suspect does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to 
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by the suspect in any case if the suspect does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it; and 
 
(d) The right to be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel.205 
The person must be informed of these rights prior to being questioned.206 
Consistent with these rights, ICC RPE Rule 112 requires that any questioning of the 
 
201 Professor Zappalà argues that Article 55’s “system of reference to other provisions reinforces the 
suggestion that there is a precise need to extend the right to legal assistance to all instances of arrest.”  
Zappalà, supra note 3, at 74.  
 202 Id. art. 85.  
 203 ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 175.  
 204 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 55.  
 205 Id.
206 Id. According to former U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues David J. Scheffer: “The 
Rome Statute includes a guarantee of a form of Miranda warning. In the United States, this right arises in 
cases of custodial interrogation. Under the jurisdiction of the ICC, the prosecutor must advise a person of 
his rights before he is questioned, whenever there are grounds to believe that he has committed a crime, 
even in non-custodial interrogations.”  David J. Scheffer, Advancing U.S. Interests with the International 
Criminal Court, 36 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1567, 1572 (2003).  Thus, the ICC is even more generous 
with respect to honoring a suspect’s interrogation rights than the due process-friendly Miranda rules in the 
United States.   
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suspect be audio or video-recorded.207 Furthermore, specific mechanisms for the 
implementation of the suspect’s right to obtain evidence in his favor prior to trial were 
adopted in ICC RPE Rule 116.208 Finally, as an indirect means of enforcing these due 
process safeguards, the Statute contains the following two-pronged exclusionary rule in 
Article 69.7: 
 
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or 
internationally recognized human rights shall not be 
admissible if: 
 
(a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the 
reliability of the evidence; or 
 
(b) The admission of the evidence would be 
antithetical to and would seriously damage 
the integrity of the proceedings.209 
b. Trial Rights 
 
ICC trial proceedings are meant to ensure “full respect for the rights of the 
accused . . .”210 The means for achieving this are found primarily in Articles 66 and 67 of 
the Rome Statute.  Article 66 provides that “everyone” shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law.211 It also specifies 
the burden of proof by declaring that the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of 
the accused.212 Finally, Article 66 spells out the standard of proof: in order to convict, 
the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt.”213 
Article 67 lays out a smorgasbord of additional trial-stage protections, including 
the right: (1) to a fair and impartial hearing; (2) to be informed promptly and in detail of 
the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully 
understands and speaks; (3) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the 
defense and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused’s choosing in confidence; 
(4) to be tried without undue delay; (5) to be present at the trial; (6) to conduct the 
defense in person or through legal assistance chosen by the accused; (7) to be informed, if 
the accused does not have legal assistance, of this right; (8) to have legal assistance 
assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it; (9) to examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (10) to raise 
defenses and present other evidence admissible under the Statute; (11) to have, if 
 
207 ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 112.  
 208 Id. R. 116.  
 209 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 69.7. 
 210 Id. art. 64.  
 211 Id. art. 66.1. 
 212 Id. art. 66.2.  
 213 Id. art. 66.3.  
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necessary, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations 
as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness; (12) to remain silent and not to be 
compelled to testify or to confess guilt, without such silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence; (13) to make an unsworn oral or written statement in 
his defense; (14) not to have imposed on him any reversal of the burden of proof or any 
onus of rebuttal; (15) to have the Prosecutor disclose any evidence which tends to show 
the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect 
the credibility of prosecution evidence.214 
Certain additional rights are scattered throughout the Statute.  For example, a 
person may not be criminally responsible, unless the conduct in question constitutes, at 
the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court (embodying the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege).215 Similarly, a person convicted by the Court may 
be punished only in accordance with the Statute (and not by some other external means – 
codifying the rule of nulla poena sine lege).216 In the same vein, no person may be 
criminally responsible for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute (enshrining 
the protection against ex post facto laws).217 Finally, the ICC, or any other court, may not 
try persons for conduct that formed the basis of crimes for which the persons have 
already been convicted or acquitted by the ICC (respecting the rule of ne bis in idem,
which is more or less equivalent to the double jeopardy prohibition).218 
Paralleling the ICTY and ICTR, another important right for the accused is to be 
tried by judges competent in criminal law/procedure and international law and who 
possess extensive experience in “a professional legal capacity.”219 Moreover, any such 
judges must adequately represent the principal legal systems of the world, and reflect 
equitable geographic and gender representation.220 These judges must be independent in 
the performance of their functions and not engage in any activity that is likely to interfere 
with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.221 Article 41 
provides a mechanism for defendants to request the disqualification of a judge whose 
impartiality may be reasonably doubted.222 
With respect to sentencing, the ICC, like the ad hoc Tribunals, forbids the death 
penalty.223 Moreover, it also provides convicted defendants with a right to appeal.224 
Although most of these rights are consistent with those accorded to suspects and 
 
214 Id. art. 67. 
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defendants in the ad hoc Tribunal systems, there are some important differences that will 
be highlighted below. 
 
4. The Expansion of Rights Vis à Vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
The relationship between the ICC prosecutor and judiciary provides significant 
insight into the ICC’s superior due process treatment of defendants in comparison to the 
ad hoc Tribunals.  As one commentator has noted, “the ICC prosecutor is overseen at 
every stage by the judiciary . . .”225 This scrutiny, particularly during the investigative 
stage, helps ensure that the due process rights of suspect and accused are respected.  For 
example, in contrast with the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC requires that the prosecutor seek 
confirmation of a judge before the provisional arrest of a suspect.226 Moreover, the 
“organ of justice” role of the ICC prosecutor, as defined in Rule 54 of the Rome Statute, 
provides another structural layer of due process protection not found in the more 
adversarial setting of the ad hoc Tribunals.  These structural innovations move the ICC 
past the ad hoc Tribunals on the fairness spectrum, opposite Nuremberg’s perceived 
“victor’s justice.”227 
Certain specific provisions in the ICC system have the same effect.  For example, 
Article 16 allows the Security Council to suspend an investigation for twelve months 
with the option of renewing the suspension indefinitely.  This mechanism within the 
Statute (apart from, and in addition to, the powers exercised by the Pre-Trial Chamber) 
could be used, for example, to derail an illegitimately motivated investigation or one that 
resulted in serious due process violations.  There is no such check on the prosecutor’s 
powers in the ad hoc Tribunal system.   
 
Moreover, the ICC’s Article 55 rights of “persons during an investigation” 
include an explicit right not to be subject to unlawful or arbitrary arrest as well as a right 
not to be subject to “coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” 228 The Statutes and RPEs of the ad hoc Tribunals 
omit reference to any such right.229 
Consistent with the above-mentioned Article 55 rights, Article 59 of the Rome 
Statute hints at a stronger degree of agency between the ICC and States cooperating in 
arrest and detention by labeling the latter as “custodial States.”230 Under the Rules of the 
 
225 Amy Powell, Three Angry Men: Juries in International Criminal Adjudication, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2341, 2362 (2004). 
226 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 58.  
 227 Leila Nadya Sadat, The Legacy of the ICTY: The International Criminal Court, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1073, 1077 (2003) (indicating the ICC will avoid the perception of “victor’s justice.”).  
 228 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 55.1.d. 
 229 See Sluiter, supra note 4, at 936 (“An important omission [from the Statutes and Rules of the ad hoc 
Tribunals] is the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, as contained in Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.”). 
 230 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 59.  See also Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1408. 
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ad hoc Tribunals, however, the supervisory responsibilities of the Tribunal do not attach 
until “the moment of . . . transfer (to actual custody of the Tribunal).”231 
Similarly, Article 85 of the Rome Statute recognizes a degree of ICC “cradle-to-
grave supervisory power”232 by granting an “enforceable right to compensation”233 for 
anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention.234 Once again, there is 
no comparable provision in the statutes or rules of the ad hoc Tribunals.235 
Another important ICC procedural safeguard is the right of the suspect, pursuant 
to Rome Statute Article 61, to participate with counsel in the indictment confirmation 
hearing.  The ad hoc Tribunals, adhering to a model of ex parte indictment review, 
provide for no such participation. 
 
Further, “in the ICC Statute the protection of the presumption of innocence is 
definitely more clearly organized [than the equivalent for the ad hoc Tribunals] and the 
provisions of the Statute take into account the multifaceted aspects of the presumption . . 
.”236 In particular, Article 66 of the Rome Statute states that everyone shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty.”237 The use of the term “everyone” stretches the 
presumption to cover more than just the accused.238 Moreover, the impact of the 
presumption has a ripple effect on evidentiary matters in the ICC.  Article 67.1(i) states 
that no reversal of the burden of proof is admissible.  According to Professor Zappalà: 
 
This is a major breakthrough because in the system of the ad hoc
Tribunals there are reversals that virtually require a probatio 
diabolica. Instances of this are: proof that the confession was 
forced (Rule 92 RPEs) or the burden being placed on the accused 
to prove that circumstances exist that may justify provisional 
release established in Rule 65 of both RPEs.239 
Finally, absent in the statutes and rules of the ad hoc Tribunals, the accused on trial 
before the ICC have “the right to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his/her 
defense.”   
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Overall, then, the ICC represents a great leap forward in the due process evolution 
of international criminal procedure.  But it does not encompass the full panoply of 
protections afforded to defendants in the most rights-protective national systems.  The 
reasons for this will be explored in the following section.   
 
III. FORCES LIMITING DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
 
From the London Charter to the Rome Statute, the community of nations has 
gradually woven together a procedural safety net for those accused in transnational courts 
of participating in large-scale, systematic violence.  That safety net, cast widely over the 
constituent instruments of international justice, is in certain respects too porous to 
preserve the full complement of due process rights owed to suspected war criminals and 
genocidaires.  The reality of global criminal prosecution, unfortunately, is often much too 
messy and complex for the best-intentioned due process schemas hatched by treaty 
negotiations and committee meetings.240 Those efforts may be stymied by three recurring 
phenomena unique to international criminal prosecution: (1) the fragmentation of 
enforcement over two or more jurisdictions; (2) the integration of two distinct, and often 
contradictory, legal systems – the common law and the civil law; and (3) the extreme 
gravity of the crimes involved. 
 
A. Fragmentation 
 
As distinct from national criminal procedure systems, international criminal 
procedure is “fragmented” between and among multiple jurisdictions.”241 For example, 
while an international tribunal may issue an arrest warrant, that warrant will be executed 
by a sovereign national jurisdiction.  That sovereign may then detain and question the 
suspect before he is transferred to the jurisdiction of the international court.  Yet another 
sovereign may conduct searches and collect evidence to be used in prosecuting the 
suspect.  Despite its best due process intentions, an international tribunal has limited 
control, if any, over the manner in which these searches are conducted or in which the 
suspect is arrested, detained or questioned.242 As a result, “the disjunction between 
authority and control, common to international institutions, is too great to allow for 
consistently fair criminal adjudication.”243 
240 See Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 486 (“It should be remembered that the drafting of the [Rome] statute 
was essentially a diplomatic exercise . . . The diplomatic pragmatism that characterizes many provisions of 
the Statute is simply not the generally accepted legislative approach of many national legal systems.”).  
Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International Criminal Court Fails 
to Be Insulated from International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. 
REV. 245, 277 (2004) (“Most of the diplomats who worked on the [Rome] statute ‘lacked expertise in 
international criminal law, comparative criminal law, or comparative criminal procedure[,]’ and ‘had no 
criminal practice experience of any kind.’”).   
 241 Sluiter, supra note 4, at 942. 
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243 Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 
YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 116 (2002). 
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1. Search and Seizure 
 
With respect to searches and seizures, fragmentation could lead to the trampling 
of privacy rights by sovereign nationals.  The Rome Statute, for example, affords the 
ICC, through Article 99(4), only very limited powers to conduct on-site investigations.244 
“This entails that intrusive measures, such as searches and seizures will have to be 
executed by the State Party upon request by the ICC.”  This could open the door to  
serious due process issues because the Rome Statute does not contain any express 
language providing for a search and seizure right to privacy.245 Thus “U.N. troops, 
national police, governmental agents, or civilian vigilantes” could “ignore the privacy 
interests of suspects or accused persons . . . in the perceived greater interest of promoting 
justice and eradicating impunity for heinous crimes . . .”246 Moreover, any evidence 
obtained from such searches could be admissible because “the ICC statute does not 
permit investigation into how a state collects evidence brought before the court . . .”247 
2. Arrest and Detention 
 
In the same spirit, this reliance on external agents can compromise the due 
process rights of international criminal defendants with respect to arrest and detention.  
As explained supra, the ad hoc Tribunals provide for the provisional arrest of suspects by 
States.  The Prosecutor may directly request a State to arrest a suspect on the standard 
that there are “grounds to believe” that the suspect “may have committed a crime over 
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.”248 The rights of the suspect include the right to 
counsel and the right to remain silent.249 
In a string of decisions ruling on defense motions for release, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has consistently held that the Tribunal has “no jurisdiction 
over the conditions of any arrest, detention or other measures carried out by a sovereign 
State at the request of the Tribunal.”250 This has resulted in questionable due process 
jurisprudence.   
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In Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, for example, Benin authorities arrested the defendant 
and placed him in custody on June 5, 1998.251 At the time of his arrest, the defendant 
happened to be at the residence of Joseph Nzirorera, a former Rwandan government 
official accused of organizing atrocities in Rwanda’s Ruhengeri province.  The Benin 
authorities were attempting to execute an ICTR arrest warrant on Nzizorera.  The 
authorities presumably did not know who Kajelijeli was -- they did not have a search 
warrant for him.252 
On September 9, 1998, the defendant, who had been the mayor of Rwanda’s 
Mukingo commune (part of the Ruhengeri province) at the time of the 1994 genocide, 
was transferred from Benin to the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.253 It was not 
until approximately five months later, on February 2, 1999, that he was assigned defense 
counsel.254 Finally, the defendant initially appeared for arraignment before a Trial 
Chamber on April 7, 1999 – roughly seven months after being transferred to the ICTR.255 
On November 9, 1998, the defendant filed a motion challenging the legality of his 
arrest and detention.  In his motion, he contended that the ICTR did not have jurisdiction 
over him, in part, because of alleged irregularities in his arrest and detention in Benin.256 
In particular, he argued that: (1) he had been arbitrarily arrested and detained; (2) when 
he was arrested on June 5, 1998, he was not informed of the reasons for his arrest; (3) he 
was detained in Benin for three months without learning the charges against him and 
without being charged; and (4) before his transfer to the ICTR, he was handed three 
documents, two of which were in language he neither spoke nor understood, and the third 
was redacted as to him, so it could not provide him with any notice, let alone adequate 
notice, of the charges against him. 
 
In dismissing Kajelijeli’s motion, the Tribunal focused on the fact that it lacked 
control over actions carried out by law enforcement officials in Benin:  
 
When the Prosecutor makes a request for the arrest of the 
Accused, the matter falls within the domain of the 
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requested State and it is that State which organizes, controls 
and carries out the arrest in accordance with their domestic 
law.  All these procedures were fulfilled in this case . . . the 
Trial Chamber therefore, considers that it cannot provide 
any remedy concerning such arrest and custody as these are 
still matters within the jurisdiction of the requested State . . 
. the Tribunal is not competent to supervise the legality of 
arrest, custody, search and seizure executed by the 
requested State. The laws of the requested State may not 
require an arrest warrant or impose other legal 
conditions.257 
The Kajelijeli case is by no means unique.  Perhaps the best known of these cases 
is Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza.258 Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was a founding member of 
the extremist Hutu-power party Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) and the 
infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), often called “Radio 
Machete.”259 
On April 15, 1996, Barayagwiza, along with a number of other Rwandans, was 
arrested in Cameroon pursuant to international arrest warrants issued by Rwanda and 
Belgium.260 The next day the ICTR Prosecutor also requested that Barayagwiza be held 
pending the Tribunal’s decision as to whether it would request his transfer to the ICTR 
seat in Arusha.261 On May 16, 1996, however, the ICTR Prosecutor notified Cameroon 
that it was no longer interested in Barayagwiza's transfer.262 On February 17, 1997, 
Cameroon denied Rwanda's extradition request and ordered Barayagwiza's release.263 At 
the same time, however, the ICTR Prosecutor again asked that Barayagwiza be held and a 
week later officially requested his transfer.264 Cameroon promptly issued a transfer order 
on March 4, but did not send Barayagwiza to Arusha until November 19, 1997.265 
On February 23, 1998, he pleaded not guilty to all counts lodged against him. The 
next day, February 24, 1998, Barayagwiza filed an "extremely urgent motion" that sought 
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to throw out his arrest because, inter alia, he had been illegally detained.266 The ICTR 
Trial Chamber denied the motion.267 
However, on November 3, 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber decision based on “abuse of process” and ordered that Barayagwiza be returned 
to Cameroon because the length of his detention had been far beyond what international 
human rights standards allow.268 The Appeals Chamber inveighed that “[n]othing less 
than the integrity of the Tribunal is at stake in this case.  Loss of public confidence in the 
Tribunal, as a court valuing human rights of all individuals--including those charged with 
unthinkable crimes--would be among the most serious consequences of allowing 
[Barayagwiza] to stand trial in the face of such violations of his rights.”269 
On November 19, 1999, the Prosecutor notified the Appeals Chamber of her 
intention to ask it to review or reconsider its ruling, and she submitted such a motion on 
December 1, citing new facts.270 The “new facts” consisted, in part, of a Cameroonian 
judge's explanations of the politics of the transfer process from Cameroon to Arusha.271 
On March 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber ruled that because the new facts showed that 
“the violations suffered by the [Accused] and the omissions of the Prosecutor are not the 
same as those which emerged from the facts on which the [November] Decision is 
founded,” the November decision should be “altered.”272 The gravamen of the Appeals 
Chamber decision in Barayagwiza II was “the new information [that] the violations of 
Barayagwiza’s rights were more due to Cameroon than the Prosecutor . . .”273 In the end, 
Cameroon’s falling on the sword had no consequences for Cameroon but entailed a 
serious derogation of Barayagwiza’s due process rights.274 
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The ICTY has faced similar issues and arrived at the same result.  In Prosecutor 
v. Nikolic,275 the defendant, the former commander of the Susica detention camp in 
Eastern Bosnia, claimed that his arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful because 
he was abducted by unknown individuals from the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (in Serbia) and then placed in the custody of the ICTY’s “special police 
force” (SFOR) in Bosnia.276 He claimed he was handcuffed and in the trunk of a car 
when handed over to SFOR277 and that SFOR had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the abduction.278 In a motion challenging the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the 
defendant requested the remedy of terminating the proceedings.279 The Chamber denied 
the motion on the grounds that, inter alia, neither the Tribunal nor SFOR were involved 
in, or had actual or constructive knowledge of, the defendant’s abduction.280 
3. Defense Efforts to Collect Evidence 
 
If international criminal prosecutors must surmount sizable obstacles to obtain all 
necessary cooperation with States, the defendants they prosecute are truly disadvantaged 
in this regard.  State reluctance to assist suspected war criminals and genocidaires is 
exacerbated by statutory mechanisms permitting States to eschew the cooperation regime.     
 
For example, ICTY Statute Article 29 provides that “States shall cooperate with 
the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”281 Under ICTY RPE 
Rule 39, the Prosecutor may summon and question witnesses and may seek the assistance 
of any State in doing so.282 Rule 54 permits judges to “issue such orders, summonses, 
subpoenas, warrants, and transfer orders as may be necessary for purposes of an 
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of trial.”283 
Nevertheless, the ICTY RPE help to neuter these provisions by creating loopholes 
for national security information (Rule 54 bis) and materials provided to the ICTY on a 
confidential basis (Rule 70).284 The same is true of the ICC.  Article 86 of the Rome 
Statute provides that “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”  On the other hand, under Article 54.3(e), materials 
provided to the Court “on the condition of confidentiality” may not be disclosed.285 
Similarly, pursuant to Article 72, a State may refuse to disclose evidence if doing so 
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would “prejudice its national security interests.”286 The defendant’s inability to collect 
such information may also go a long way toward curtailing his due process rights. 
 
The ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Blaskic is illustrative.287 Tihomir Blaskic, a 
Bosnian Croat, had been a colonel and then a general in the Croation Defense Council (or 
“HVO,” the Bosnian Croat army).288 In the spring of 1993, HVO forces engaged in 
ethnic cleansing measures that resulted in the massacre of Muslim civilians in the central 
Bosnian Lasva Valley region -- most infamously in the village of Ahmici.289 Blaskic was 
the commander of the HVO's Central Bosnia Operative Zone at the time.290 On 
November 10, 1995, the ICTY indicted Blaskic (relying on the command responsibility 
doctrine) for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, and violations of the laws or customs of war. Blaskic surrendered himself to the 
Tribunal in 1996.291 
On January 15, 1997, the ICTY issued subpoenas duces tecum to, inter alia, the 
Republic of Croatia, its Defense Minister, as well as to its Custodian of Records of the 
Central Archives.292 The subpoenas ordered the State and its officials to produce 
documents concerning the military command structures and plans of military actions.293 
The matter was brought before Trial Chamber II, which found that ICTY judges had 
authority to issue orders, such as subpoenas, to States, high government officials and 
individuals.294 Croatia appealed and on October 29, 1997, the Appeals Chamber ruled to 
quash the subpoena.295 In doing so, it defined the scope of the ICTY’s judicial reach in 
relation to sovereign States.  While it held that the ICTY could issue binding orders to 
States, 296 it also found that it could not issue binding orders to specific State officials 
acting in their official capacity.297 It further held that the ICTY has no enforcement 
powers in relation to States.298 Rather, its only recourse is to report such non-compliance 
to the Security Council.299 Finally, the Appeals Chamber ruled that States could invoke a 
“national security” justification for withholding evidence.300 
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Blaskic was eventually tried, convicted and sentenced to 45 years’ 
imprisonment.301 Only a few days later, Croatian authorities announced they had found 
documents that may have exonerated him.302 These documents had come to light after 
the death of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, who had opposed disclosing documents 
in connection with the Blaskic proceedings.303 On March 17, 2000, Blaskic filed a notice 
of appeal and ultimately submitted 8,000 pages of additional evidence to the Appellate 
Chamber.304 On July 29, 2004, based in part on the new evidence obtained from Croatia, 
the Appeals Chamber reversed 16 of the Trial Chamber’s 19 convictions and reduced 
Blaskic’s sentence to nine years’ imprisonment.305 Thus, the Blaskic case perfectly 
demonstrates fragmentation’s potential for pernicious effects on due process in the pre-
trial stage. 
 
4. Compelling Witness Testimony 
 
In addition to documentary evidence, international defendants may also face 
troublesome obstacles in securing the presence of favorable witnesses at trial.  Pursuant 
to the Rome Statute, for example, “States Parties are under no duty to compel witnesses 
to appear in the Hague to testify at trial.”306 Under Rule 93(1)(e) of the Rome Statute, the 
duty of States is limited to the facilitation of the voluntary appearance of a person as a 
witness.307 
Some observers have gone so far as to posit a right of witnesses not to appear 
before the ICC.308 Under this provision, a person in custody in the requested State may 
be transferred to the ICC only if that person freely consents to the transfer.  These 
observers argue that if the person’s transfer to the ICC’s custody hinges on that person’s 
consent, then, by extrapolation, the same must be true for all other witnesses.309 
chamber set forth certain guidelines for such scrutiny but left the development of the exact procedures to 
the trial chambers.  Id., ¶¶ 68, 69.  See also Herwig Roggemann, National Security and Protection of the 
State in National and International Criminal Procedure: Systematic and Comparative Aspects, in 
Roggemann, supra note 11, at  [hereinafter National Security]; Sean D. Murphy, Progress and 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 81-
83 (1999).   
301 Blaskic Trial Judgment, supra note 287. 
 302 Katz Cogan, supra note 243, at 122.  
 303 Id.
304 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A Judgment Appeal (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter 
Blaskic Trial Judgment Appeal]; Mark A. Drumbl, ICTY Appeals Chamber Delivers Two Major 
Judgments: Blaskic and Krstic, American Society of International Law Insights (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh143.htm.    
 305 Drumbl, supra note 304.  
 306 Kress, supra note 182, at 616.  
 307 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 93(1)(e).  This principle of voluntary appearance of witnesses 
before the ICC conflicts with Article 69(2)’s dictate that the testimony of a witness shall be given in person.  
See Kress, supra note 182, at 616.   Moreover, “the legal framework of the Ad Hoc Tribunals have not 
adopted the principle of voluntary of appearance.”  See Sluiter, supra  note 10, at 254. 
 308 See, e.g. Sluiter, supra note 10, at 254. 
 309 See id.; Kress, supra note 182, at 616.  Kress contends, however, that this interpretation of Article 
93(7) runs directly counter to Article 64(6)(b), which empowers the Trial Chamber to “require the 
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Overall, then, international defendants must rely on the kindness of strangers (i.e. 
States) for fairness in the way they are searched, seized, detained, notified of the charges 
against them, provided with counsel (if at all), transferred to an international court for 
arraignment and given access to witnesses, documents and other possible exculpatory 
evidence.  Such kindness is often lacking and this is an inherent constraint on the 
application and growth of due process in international criminal procedure.310 
B. Integration 
 
The second inhibiting factor, “integration,” refers to the efforts of international 
criminal procedure to harmonize the differing rules of its member countries into a 
cohesive system that will satisfy all concerned.  As pointed out earlier, the primary 
tension in this regard is between two legal systems: the Anglo-American common law 
system versus the civil law system, which predominates in continental Europe.  Because 
civil law systems place “more limitations on the rights of defendants” than do common 
law systems,311compromises made to appease civil law practitioners may result in 
constricting the rights of defendants that are cherished as fundamental by common law 
jurists.  
 
This phenomenon, as demonstrated previously, certainly played a role in the 
diminution of due process rights at Nuremberg.  But six decades on, after the blossoming 
human rights movement has reached full flower, what fundamental prerogatives have 
been dispensed with in deference to continental practice?  In contrast to the 
“fragmentation” phenomenon (primarily affecting pre-trial matters), the impact of 
integration is seen mostly in the trial and post-trial stages.  A derogation of rights comes 
into focus primarily with respect to three areas: (1) permitting the functional equivalent 
of trials in absentia; (2) permitting the admission of evidence through other than live 
witness testimony; and (3) exposing defendants to the perils of double jeopardy. 
 
attendance and testimony of witnesses.”  Id; Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 64(6)(b).  According to 
Kress, this Article “clearly implies an international obligation upon witnesses to comply with a request of 
the Trial Chamber to appear.”  Kress, supra, note 182, at 616.   
 310 See generally, William A. Schabas, National Security Interests and the Rights of the Accused, in 
National Security, supra note 300.  As mentioned supra, however, international courts can at least provide 
monetary awards to defendants deprived of due process.  They can also exclude evidence obtained through, 
or in connection with, such deprivations. 
 311 Martha Kimes, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Convictions under American Offender Statutes: A 
Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 525 n.123 (1997).  See also, Cassese, supra note 15, at 383.  This is true even in 
completely different forums such as international athletic doping cases.  See Michael S. Straubel, Doping 
Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 544 
(“Although much of the international conflict over doping control is the result of a clash between United 
States common law notions of due process on the one side and civil law notions of due process on the other 
side, United States standards of procedural due process offer the most protection to an accused athlete.”). 
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1. The Functional Equivalent of Trials in Absentia 
Under the ICTY RPE, the first step toward trial is the Prosecutor’s submission of 
an indictment for confirmation by a judge.312 After a review hearing and confirmation of 
the indictment, a warrant, sent to the relevant States, is issued for the accused’s arrest.313 
The Prosecutor may also request, through the ICTY Registrar, that the national 
authorities of the relevant States publish the indictment in widely circulated newspapers. 
314 
In cases where these measures fail to bring about the arrest of the accused, the 
Tribunal may resort to Rule 61, which sets out the “Procedure in Case of Failure to 
Execute a Warrant.”  There are essentially two steps in the Rule 61 procedure.  The first 
step requires the Prosecutor to satisfy the confirmation judge that the Prosecutor has 
taken all reasonable steps to effect personal service.  After this begins the second step in 
the procedure, known as the Rule 61 hearing.  At this stage, the Prosecutor must submit 
the indictment and supporting evidence, which may include witness testimony, to the 
Trial Chamber in open court.315 If, on the basis of the above evidence “together with 
such additional evidence as the Prosecutor may tender,” the Trial Chamber is satisfied 
that “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any 
of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall so determine.”316 In addition, the 
Chamber will issue an international arrest warrant for the accused317 and may order a 
State to provisionally freeze the accused's assets.318 
In his opening statement at the Tribunal’s first Rule 61 hearing against Dragan 
Nikolic, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Prosecutor of the Tribunal, asserted that 
such proceedings have important consequences: “The publication of the evidence before 
the Tribunal . . . will constitute a permanent judicial record for all time of the horrendous 
war crimes that have been committed in the former Yugoslavia. That public record will 
assist in attributing guilt to individuals . . .”319 
312 ICTY RPE, supra note 94, R. 47(A).  
 313 Id. R.R. 55, 56, 58 & 59.  
 314 Id. R. 60.  
 315 Id. R. 61(E).   
 316 Id. R. 61(C).  
 317 Id. R. 61(D). 
 318 Id. If the Chamber is satisfied that “the failure to effect personal service was due in whole or in part 
to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate with the Tribunal in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute 
[it] shall so certify.” Id, R. 61(E).  The certification may trigger notification to the United Nations Security 
Council of the State's failure or refusal to cooperate with the Tribunal.  Id.
319 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-I (Oct. 9, 1995) (Goldstone, J., opening statement).   
Nikolic was a Bosnian Serb commandant of the Susica Detention Center in the Vlasenica region of Bosnia 
Herzegovina.  Id. On 4 November 1994, Nikolic became the first person to be indicted by the ICTY. He 
was arrested on April 20, 2000 by the SFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina and immediately transferred to the 
ICTY, on April 21, 2000.  See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-2-A (Feb. 4, 2005).  On 
September 4, 2003, Nikolic pled guilty to several counts of crimes against humanity.  Id. After appealing 
his sentence as decided by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber sentenced him to twenty years’ 
imprisonment on February 4, 2005.  Id.
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In light of this rationale for Rule 61 hearings, they have been “characterized as the 
functional equivalent of trials.”320 In this sense, Rule 61 “protects the interests of the civil 
law countries [in trials in absentia] because a civil law inquisitorial method was adopted 
in the procedure which allows a Trial Chamber at the ICTY to examine and question 
witnesses and pronounce whether there is reason to believe the suspect committed the 
crimes specified in the indictment.”321 According to Professor William Schabas, “They 
[Rule 61 proceedings] really were in absentia trials, the only meaningful distinction 
being they didn’t impose a sentence when it was over.”322 
As a result, “many believe [this form of trial in absentia] does not comport with 
the norms of due process under the international human rights regime.”323 Of the laundry 
list of due process violations defendant’s absence entails, perhaps the most egregious is 
the inability to cross-examine witnesses.324 Less obvious, perhaps, is the proceeding’s 
standard of proof.  At the end of the hearing, as noted above, the judges state whether 
there are mere “reasonable grounds” to believe the accused has committed the acts 
charged in the indictment.325 This finding has been described as “a determination of 
guilt.”326 Thus, “reasonable grounds” is certainly an anemic standard of proof in contrast 
to the robust “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard prevailing in customary rights-
protective criminal adjudications.327 
Regrettably, the potential for such pre-trial kangaroo courts exists at the ICC as 
well.  As explained previously, Article 61(2) of the ICC RPE allows the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to conduct confirmation hearings in the absence of the person charged.328 This 
occurs when it is not possible to find the person charged in spite of reasonable steps taken 
 
320 Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 231, 234 
(1998).  These proceedings were conducted on a fairly regular basis in the early years of the ICTY.  Several 
ICTY defendants have been the subject of Rule 61 hearings, including Radovan Karadzic and Radko 
Mladic.  See Anne L. Quintal, The “Voice of the Victims” Screams out for Justice, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 723, 757 (1998).   
 321 Quintal, supra note 320, at 747.  Quintal also notes that trials in absentia are common in civil law 
countries.  Id. at 739-42.  
322 Centennial Universal Congress of Lawyers Conference, The Influence of International Law and 
International Tribunals on Harmonized or Hybrid Systems of Criminal Procedure, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. 
L. Rev. 651, 655 (2005).  
 323 Quintal, supra note 320, at 752.  Rule 61 proceedings do not even afford defendants the rights 
normally accorded to defendants by civil law jurisdictions for in absentia trials.  See  Faiza Patel King, 
Public Disclosure in Rule 61 Hearings Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 523, 541 (1997) (“The design of the Tribunal's Rule 61 
procedure prevents the accused from asserting many of the specific rights that have been recognized as 
applicable during in absentia trials.”). 
 324 Quintal, supra note 320, at 752-53.  
 325 ICTY RPE, supra note 94, R. 61(C).  
 326 Quintal, supra note 320, at 753.  
 327 Id. At least one scholar believes that, at the very least, the standard applied at Rule 61 hearings 
should be “clear and convincing.”  See Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, 
International Criminal Law, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 127, 160 (1995).  He reckons that having a higher standard would increase the legitimacy and 
credibility of the Tribunal.  Id.
328 ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 61(2).  
42
to secure his appearance.329 As with the ICTY RPE, this confirmation hearing in 
absentia was a concession to those delegations at the Rome conference that had 
unsuccessfully argued in favor of trials in absentia.330 One commentator has observed: 
“These confirmation hearings bear a certain resemblance to the Rule 61 proceedings 
before the ICTY.”331 As such, from a due process perspective, they are equally deficient. 
 
2. Trial by Transcript 
 
As revealed by the Nuremberg experience, the civil law inquisitorial system has 
no qualms about admitting the testimony of witnesses through sworn affidavits, 
transcripts or other written means, as opposed to live in-court testimony.332 In its current 
form, international criminal procedure is influenced by the same policy.  In fact, “the 
precedent available . . . from the ICTY allows for testimony via affidavit in what is at 
best a very weak cross-examination guarantee for the accused.”333 
In particular, ICTY RPE Rule 92 bis (adopted in 2000)334 is designed to provide a 
mechanism for submitting evidence in writing that concerns matters more peripheral to 
the crimes charged, such as the background of the conflict, statistical analysis, the 
character of the accused and sentencing matters.335 In the first case to address the 
application of Rule 92 bis, the Trial Chamber noted that the rule’s intent, consistent with 
civil law objectives, was “to try and cut down the length of these trials . . .  [A] large 
amount of time in this Tribunal has been taken up with pointless and repetitive cross-
examination, and this Rule is aimed at dealing with it.”  Thus, the rule “clearly evinces 
the trend towards broader resort to the admission of written evidence.”336 Professor 
Zappalà has noted the deleterious effects this trend may have on due process: 
 
Affidavits are in principle less trustworthy than depositions 
because they are taken ex parte, without any chance of 
cross-examination.  Moreover, they present the same 
drawbacks as hearsay evidence, since they are out-of-court 
 
329 Id.
330 See Kress, supra, note 182, at 610-11.   
 331 Id. at 611.  
 332 See Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav 
Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. L.J. 217 (2002) (“In civil law systems, however, there is a far wider use 
of written witness statements . . .”).  
 333 Walker, supra note 240, at 283.   
 334 See Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 
CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 47, 71 (2003).  Although initially stating a preference for “live testimony” in its RPE, 
the ICTY has moved to a “no preference alternative.”  Id. Rule 92 bis essentially replaced Rule 94 ter,
which had been even more permissive with respect to admission of written statements.  Id. See Prosecutor 
v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-Y (Sept. 18, 2000) (Appeals Chamber decision overruling Trial Chamber’s 
admission of statement of deceased witness implicating accused that was not given under oath, never 
subject to cross-examination, uncorroborated by other evidence, and was verbally translated by an 
interpreter from Croatian to English before it was written down in English by an investigator whose native 
language was Dutch).  See also Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1427-28. 
 335 ICTY RPE, supra note 94, R. 61(C).  Moreover, Sub-rule 89(C) provides that “a Chamber may 
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”  Id., Sub-R. 89(C). 
 336 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 138.  
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statements presented at trial . . . When affidavits are 
submitted, defendants are clearly not confronted with the 
source of the evidence.  Additionally, affidavits lack those 
elements of orality and direct examination that should 
characterize the presentation of evidence in adversarial 
trials.337 
The due process mischief sanctioned by ICTY Rule 92 bis was on display in 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica,338 where the Trial Chamber admitted into evidence, inter alia, two 
witness statements relating to arguably central issues in the Prosecutor’s case.339 The 
Trial Chamber acknowledged that one of these statements was capable of “[constituting] 
a means of proof of an element of the genocide charge against the accused . . .”340 And it 
characterized the other as “capable of going towards the proof of the crime of genocide 
with which Mr. Sikirica is charged.”341 As a result, the defense sought to cross-examine 
these witnesses with respect to the full scope of their previous testimony.342 However, 
the Trial Chamber permitted only limited cross-examination.  With respect to one of the 
statements, the Chamber held:  
 
The fact that a witness’s account is alleged to be one-sided 
is a matter which can be dealt with by comments in final 
submissions or the calling of evidence. The way to deal 
with new evidence alleged, to contradict the witness’s 
evidence, is to call the new evidence.343 
Thus, rather than permit the defense to challenge the witness directly and test his 
credibility viva voce with respect to bias and “new evidence,” the Trial Chamber allowed 
Rule 92 bis to infringe on the defendant’s confrontation rights. 
 
In the case of Prosecutor v. Galic, the Trial Chamber allowed into evidence, 
pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C), the statements of two witnesses, since deceased.344 In 
granting an interlocutory appeal with respect to one of the statements, the Appeals 
 
337 Id. at 137. 
 338 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8, Trial Chamber Decision on Prosecutor’s Application to 
Admit Transcripts under Rule 92 bis (May 23, 2001).  
 339 The statements consisted of transcripts of testimony given in different trials.  Although there had 
been the opportunity for cross-examination, this testimony involved different accused in separate 
proceedings.  
 340 Id. ¶ 11.  
 341 Id. ¶ 21.   The Trial Chamber admitted four other transcripts pursuant to Rule 92 bis. It 
acknowledged that one related to the accused in a “significant and direct way.”  Id., ¶ 35.  The Trial 
Chamber did permit full cross-examination in relation to this statement.  Id.
342 Two other defendants were on trial with Sikirica: Dragan Kolundzija and Damir Dosen.  The 
attorneys for all three of the accused wanted full cross-examination of these witnesses.  Sikirica was 
permitted cross-examination “on the limited issue” of rapes committed at a detention camp (id. ¶ 21) and 
facts relating to intent (id. ¶ 11).   
 343 Id. ¶ 21.  
 344 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 
92 bis (C) (June 7, 2002).  
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Chamber observed that parties may use Rule 92 bis statements to establish the acts and 
conduct of others (i.e., not the accused).345 Parties may then marshal such evidence to 
establish the state of mind of the accused.346 The Appeals Chamber provided the 
following example of the latter: “An easy example would be proof, in relation to Article 5 
of the Tribunal's Statute, of the knowledge by the accused that his acts fitted into a 
pattern of widespread or systematic attacks directed against a civilian population.”347 
According to one commentator: 
 
That these interpretations of the Rule are a far cry from its 
‘original purpose’ is evident.  It is further worth noting, 
however, that the admission of such statements without 
cross-examination, as the decision suggests, and as the Rule 
allows, runs contrary even to the precedent established at 
Nuremberg.  [A cause for concern] is the nearly limitless 
discretion conferred upon the Trial Chambers in the 
employment of the Rule.  Inherent in this enhanced 
discretion is the fact that determinations made by a Trial 
Chamber would likely only be reversed if the decision at 
issue evidences a clear abuse of discretion, a fact that 
conceivably may not bode well vis-à-vis the fair trial rights 
of the accused.348 
ICC criminal procedure may be subject to the same vice.  Rome Statute Article 
69(2) permits previously recorded testimony, documents and transcripts (subject to the 
RPE) as evidence at trial.349 With respect to recorded testimony, Rule 68(a) of the ICC 
RPE requires that the Prosecutor and the defense have the opportunity to examine the 
witness during the recording.350 Nevertheless, “it will be for the judges to develop more 
specific criteria to give proper weight to the general principle, laid down in Article 69(2), 
that witnesses shall testify before the Court in person.”351 
3. Double Jeopardy   
 
The integration of common and civil law circumscribes yet another fundamental 
right of international criminal defendants: the protection against double jeopardy.  The 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
 
345 Id. ¶ 11 
 346 Id.
347 Id. See also Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 197, 218 (2003).  
 348 Fairlie, supra note 334, at 78-79.  
 349 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 69(2).  See Kress, supra note 182, at 611.  Still, Article 69(2) 
mandates that such admission not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.  Rome 
Statute, supra note 154, art. 69(2). 
 350 ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 68(a).  
 351 Kress, supra note 182, at 611.  
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protects persons from being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 352 While, as 
noted earlier, defendants in both the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC have a right not to be 
placed in double jeopardy,353 that right is couched in the civil law protection of  “non bis 
in idem” which roughly translates from Latin into: “Not twice for the same thing.”354 
Although double jeopardy and “non bis in idem” are roughly comparable,355 there is one 
significant due process difference, as explained by Professor Sean Murphy: 
 
The principle of non bis in idem is similar to, but different 
from, the prohibition on “double jeopardy” in common law 
countries.  Non bis in idem addresses the possibility of 
repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different 
legal systems, whereas double jeopardy generally refers to 
repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in the same 
legal system.356 
As a result, in contrast with the common law practice, non bis in idem permits the 
prosecutor to appeal an acquittal for errors of law and questions of fact.357 In France’s 
civil law system, for example, the parties in a criminal case may appeal a conviction, an 
acquittal, a dismissal or a sentence.358 Moreover, on appeal a reviewing court may 
reverse and remand the case, or revise the judgment.359 Both prosecutorial challenge and 
appellate review of acquittals are anathema to common law notions of the double 
jeopardy protection.360 
352 U.S. Const. amend. V (“no person shall be ... subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.”). The clause provides three separate protections for criminal defendants: (1) protection 
against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal (autre fois acquit); (2) protection 
against successive prosecutions for the same offense after conviction (autre fois convict); and (3) protection 
against multiple punishments for the same offense.  See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998). 
 353 See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 10; ICTR Statute, supra note 96, art. 10; Rome Statute, supra 
note 154, art. 20. See also Jennifer E. Costa, Double Jeopardy and Non Bis In Idem: Principles of Fairness,
4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 181, 183 (1998) (“The double jeopardy/non bis in idem provisions of the 
Draft [ICC] Statute, however, draw primarily from the civil law tradition.”) 
 354 See Keith R. Fisher, In Rem Alternatives to Extradition for Money Laundering, 25 LOY. L.A.  INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 409, 434-35 n. 116 (2003); Christensen, supra note 13, at 420. 
 355 See Fisher, supra note 354, at 434-35.  
 356 Murphy, supra note 300, at 79 n. 43.  There is another important difference.  Double jeopardy only 
applies within a sovereign.  Thus, double jeopardy prevents a sovereign from prosecuting the same person 
for a single offense more than once.   Meanwhile, non bis in idem is more flexible as to subsequent 
prosecutions by the same sovereign but bars prosecutions for a single offense by separate sovereigns.  See . 
Costa, supra note 353, at 183 (1998). 
 357 Dax Eric Lopez, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Is Used to Circumvent 
Non Bis in Idem, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1263, 1283 (2000) (“Unlike Common Law countries, 
however, prosecutors may appeal errors of law and questions of fact under non bis in idem.”).  
 358 Costa, supra note 353, at 190.  
 359 Id.
360 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 175 (“Generally speaking, it may be argued that in common law 
systems prosecutorial appeals would be seen as a violation of the protection against double jeopardy.  On 
the other hand, in civil law countries the power of the Prosecutor to appeal against acquittal is a normal 
feature of the legal system.”).  In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that  “it is one of the 
elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an 
appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 
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The due process implications of this procedural wedge between common and civil 
law are on display in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda.361 In that case, the ICTR Trial Chamber 
acquitted Georges Rutaganda, a prominent Hutu businessman and former second vice 
president (youth wing) of a Hutu extremist militia (the “Interahamwe”), of war crimes 
(violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II 
thereto) for his alleged role in directing attacks against Tutsis at the École Technique 
Officiel (ETO School) and the Nyanza gravel pit in the Kigali area.362 The Trial 
Chamber held that the prosecution failed to establish the required nexus between 
Rutaganda’s criminal acts and the armed conflict.363 The prosecution challenged this 
factual finding on appeal and the Appeals Chamber reversed.364 
Because the Trial Chamber had made factual findings recognizing a link between 
the ETO school and Nyanza massacres and the armed conflict, and had determined that 
Rutaganda had participated in these attacks, the Appeals Chamber concluded that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
existed a nexus between Rutaganda’s participation in the killings at the ETO School and 
the armed conflict.365 Since the Trial Chamber's erroneous conclusion that a nexus had 
not been established was the only basis for its acquittal of Rutaganda on the two counts 
of war crimes, the Appeals Chamber convicted him on those counts.366 
To common law ears, the strange cluster of the words “the Appeals Chamber 
convicted him” sounds blasphemous.  It signifies that the prosecution received a second 
bite at the apple. 367 From a fairness perspective, a prosecutor’s right to appeal acquittals 
is “not necessarily appropriate in international criminal proceedings.”368 Yet it is another 
due process casualty that results from forcing the square peg of the common law system 
into the round hole of the civil law system.  
 
C. Gravity 
 
International criminal law deals with the most horrific, large-scale crimes human 
 
(1957).  The Court went on to articulate the policy behind the double jeopardy ban: “(T)hat the State with 
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live 
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty.” Id. at 187-188. However, it should be noted that, even in common law 
systems, the prosecutor has a limited power to appeal based on errors of law.  See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 
175. 
 361 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 6, 1999).   
 362 Nevertheless, for these acts he was convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity and 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Id.
363 Id. ¶¶ 443-45.  
 364 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A , Appeal Chamber Judgment (May 26, 2003).  
 365 Id. ¶ 580. 
 366 Id. ¶ 584. 
 367 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 177.  
 368 Id.
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beings can commit.  The horror of these crimes, as well as the intense suffering they visit 
on victims, have to some degree put the human rights movement on the horns of a 
dilemma: vindicate the due process rights of the accused or adequately punish the 
perpetrator?  Professor Paul Dubinsky sees a normative priority evolution from the 
former to the latter: “A new subfield – call it “atrocity law” – [has] exerted increasing 
influence on the human rights movement as a whole, creating a shift in emphasis from 
procedural due process to holding perpetrators accountable and providing remedies to 
victims.”369 As demonstrated above, the magnitude of the horror adjudged at Nuremberg 
likely played a part in limiting the due process protections afforded to defendants in that 
proceeding.370 
The same consideration exerts a limiting force with respect to certain procedural 
protections offered to international criminal defendants today.  This portion of the Article 
will focus on three areas where this has been an issue: (1) pre-trial detention and 
provisional release; (2) witnesses protection and victims’ rights; and (3) the right to trial 
by jury.   
 
1. Pre-Trial Detention 
 
The general practice in the ad hoc Tribunals reveals that once the indictment is 
confirmed, the defendants are normally held in pre-trial detention.371 Pursuant to 
consistent Tribunal practice, the judge confirming the indictment also issues one or more 
arrest warrants addressed to relevant State authorities requesting the arrest and transfer of 
the accused.372 The indicted person should then be arrested and transferred to the custody 
of the Tribunal.373 Thereafter, the accused is detained at the UN Detention facility (either 
in the Hague or Arusha) and may be released only under the conditions set out in Rule 65 
of the RPEs for both Tribunals.374 
At this stage, an essential pre-trial prerogative for criminal defendants “is the right 
to apply for provisional or interim release.”375 In fact, a policy for provisional release is a 
“natural outgrowth of the presumption of innocence.”376 For to presume that an accused 
is innocent means, among other things, that punishment cannot begin until an accused is 
convicted.377 As a result: 
 
369 Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 
YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 213 (2005).  See also Katz Cogan, supra note 243, at 112 (explaining that the relative 
lack of interest in the rights of international criminal defendants can be explained, in part “by the reversal, 
in the international context, of the typical left/right domestic political alignment on prosecutorial 
prerogatives.”).      
 370 See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21-22.  
 371 See id. at 70.  
 372 See id.
373 See id.
374 See id.
375 Knoops, supra note 14, at 109. 
376 Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 577 (2003).  
 377 See id.
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[D]etention must serve some other distinguishable goal. 
Unless the prosecution can show strong countervailing 
interests such as danger to victims or witnesses or a risk of 
flight, the accused must be temporarily released pending 
trial. The argument for temporary release is at its strongest 
when the accused faces a long period of detention before 
the court decides his guilt or innocence.378 
Nevertheless, in contravention of the presumption of innocence, Rule 65 of the ad
hoc Tribunals’ RPEs (governing pre-trial release) was for many years extremely 
restrictive and placed on the accused the burden of showing “exceptional circumstances” 
to justify release.379 Under this rule, provisional release was granted “only in very rare 
cases in which the condition of the accused, notably the accused’s state of health, is not 
compatible with any form of detention.”380 
Although Rule 65 of each RPE has been amended to remove the “exceptional 
circumstances” requirement,381 the burden is still on the accused to prove that he will 
appear for trial and not pose a danger to any victim, witness, or other person.382 
Moreover, both the Statutes and RPEs of the Tribunals “lack clear and precise criteria 
with regard to the application of the concrete possibility of release on bail.”383 As a 
 
378 Id.
379 See Knoops, supra note 14, at 109.  See also Zappalà, supra note 3, at 70 (“Originally, Rule 65 was 
extremely  restrictive and provided for provisional release only in exceptional circumstances, which the 
accused had to prove.”);  ICTY RPE, supra note 94, former R. 65(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 99, former R. 
65(B).  
 380 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Decision Rejecting a Request for Provisional Release 
(Mar. 3, 2000).  
 381 See Knoops, supra note 14, at 109.  
 382 See, e.g., ICTY RPE, supra note 94, R. 65 (A) & (B).  See also Matthew M. DeFrank, Provisional 
Release: Current Practice, a Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 
1449 (2002); Knoops, supra note 14, at 112.  This runs afoul of prevailing international norms.  For 
example, Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:  
 
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge ... and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be 
subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the 
judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the 
judgment (emphasis added).  ICCPR, supra note 57. 
 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights declares that "[e]veryone charged with a 
criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law." ECHR, supra note 60.  
Article 6(1) includes the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.  Id. Together these 
rights are usually taken to require that "the prosecution must overcome the presumption of innocence by 
demonstrating that the accused is likely to flee or commit a new crime before it may detain him prior to 
conviction."  See Patricia Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY: A Work in Progress, in 
ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 231, 233-34 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).  
 383 Knoops, supra note 14, at 109.  
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result, “it still remains true that liberty is the exception while detention is the rule”384 and, 
for the most part, “post-amendment, provisional-release practices operate in exactly the 
same manner.”385 
Nor can one be sanguine about the prospect of a more progressive provisional 
release regime for the ICC.  The Rome Statute allows the accused to apply for provisional 
release in two situations: (1) to the competent authorities in the custodial State pending 
surrender proceedings, while being detained in that State (pursuant to Article 59(3))386;
and (2) to the ICC once the accused is detained in the Hague pending trial (pursuant to 
Articles 60 (1), (2)).387 In the case of the custodial State, authorities may only allow 
provisional release when justified by “urgent and exceptional circumstances” and in the 
presence of sufficient safeguards to ensure its ICC surrender obligations.388 Once in ICC 
custody, the Pre-Trial Chamber may grant provisional release only if it is not satisfied 
that the following conditions are met: (1) no reasonable grounds exist for believing that 
the accused has committed the particular crime; or (2) his arrest appears no longer 
necessary (i.e., to ensure appearance at trial or to prevent obstruction of the investigation 
and trial).389 
Unfortunately, similar to the ad hoc Tribunals and contrary to Article 9(3) of the 
ICCPR, both forms of ICC provisional release are framed on the presumption in favor of 
detention.390 This means that “both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC endorse a 
provisional release standard that deviates from human rights law.”391 According to one 
commentator: “The only justification for this stringency that comes to mind is the gravity 
of the offenses over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction and the desire to avoid a public 
outcry over allowing accused persons to be at large.”392 
2. Witness Protection and Victim Rights 
 
There is an ineluctable tension in certain phases of war crimes prosecutions 
between upholding the due process rights of the accused and assuring the safety and 
dignity of witnesses to unspeakable horrors.  Not surprisingly, that tension often resolves 
itself in favor of the victims/witnesses.  At the same time, in the eyes of many, the 
awesome gravity of the crime transforms the juridical status of the victim from mere 
bystander to party opponent.  Investing the victim with such procedural stature and access 
 
384 Zappalà, supra note 3, at 70.  
 385 DeFrank, supra note 382, at 449.  Although some ICTY defendants have been granted pre-trial 
provisional release, no ICTR defendants have.  See Rearick, supra note 376, at 590 (noting that 12 ICTY 
applications for provisional release were granted between 2000 and 2003). 
 386 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 59(3).  
 387 Id. art. 60(1), (2).  
 388 Id. art. 59.  See Knoops, supra note 14, at 112.  
 389 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 58(1).  See Knoops, supra note 14, at 112.  
 390 Knoops, supra note 14, at 112.  See also William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC109 
(2001).  
 391 Knoops, supra note 14, at 112. 
 392 Nsereko, supra note 122, at 532 (emphasis added).  
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may improperly tilt the scales of justice overwhelmingly in favor of the prosecution.  
This section will explore how that could happen.     
 
a. Witness Anonymity and Due Process 
 
The proceedings in a witness protection motion in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Tadic393 read somewhat like a legal morality play pitting the value of safeguarding a 
defendant’s rights against the necessity to shield vulnerable witnesses.  Dusko Tadic, an 
ethnic Serb from Bosnia-Herzegovina, was arrested in Germany in early 1994 and 
charged by German authorities with crimes committed in the Omarska prison camp 
during the spring of 1992.  Pursuant to a request by the ICTY, Germany transferred 
custody of Tadic to the ICTY in April 1995. 394 
The ICTY indicted Tadic on 132 counts of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.395 These crimes included “forcible sexual intercourse or rape, willful killing or 
murder, willfully causing grave suffering or serious injury, torture, cruel treatment and 
the commission of inhumane acts . . .”396 
As the prosecution prepared its case against Tadic, it realized that several 
traumatized witnesses were unwilling to testify in open court.397 As a result, on May 18, 
1995, the prosecution filed its Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and 
Witnesses. 398 Out of fourteen prayers for relief, two requested complete witness 
anonymity.399 Of those, one requested “that testimony of . . . witnesses may be given 
using voice and image altering devices or by not transmitting the image of the accused to 
the defense.”400 The other requested that, inter alia, the “prosecution may withhold from 
the defense and the accused the names of, and other identifying data concerning 
witnesses G, H, I, J, and K.”401 
In a controversial 2-1 decision, the Trial Chamber granted the motion.  It began 
by acknowledging that witness anonymity is an extraordinary measure in traditional 
domestic criminal trials and that it could be a barrier to accurate fact-finding.402 In 
addition, Article 21 of the ICTY Statute gave Tadic the right “to examine, or have 
 
393 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1,Trial Judgment (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter Tadic Trial 
Judgment].  
 394 See id.
395 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Indictment (Feb. 13, 1995).  
 396 Id.
397 See Alan Tieger, Address at War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects Conference at the 
Washington College of Law (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1998), in the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1441, 1446-47 (1998) (ICTY Senior Trial Attorney stated that “there were certainly witnesses who 
were too traumatized or too embittered to testify.”). 
 398 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T Protective Measures Decision (Aug. 10, 1995)[hereinafter 
Tadic Protective Measures Decision]. 
 399 Id. ¶ 3.  
 400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id. at ¶¶ 54, 60, 67.  
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examined, the witnesses against him” and to receive “a fair and public hearing.”403 The 
Trial Chamber pointed out, however, that Article 21 is expressly subject to Article 22,404 
which provides for witness protection including “the conduct of in camera proceedings 
and the protection of the victim’s identity.”405 
The Trial Chamber then acknowledged that courts interpreting international 
instruments phrased similarly to Article 21 have uniformly rejected witness anonymity 
protective measures in criminal cases.406 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber distinguished 
those cases on both factual and legal grounds.  Factually, it noted that, in contrast to the 
cases cited, the Tribunal had a particular dependence on eyewitness testimony407 in a 
climate of “terror and anguish among the civilian population.”408 Legally, the Trial 
Chamber distinguished the cases on the basis of the Statute’s “unique legal framework,” 
which provides specially for the protection of victims and witnesses.409 Then, most 
importantly for the analysis here, the Chamber found that standards applicable to 
“ordinary criminal and ... civil adjudications” were not appropriate for the “horrific” 
crimes and then-ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia.410 
Thus, the extraordinary nature of the crimes at issue was a factor in adopting 
measures that circumscribed Tadic’s right to a fair trial.  Judge Ninian Stephen of 
Australia dissented, however, writing that complete witness anonymity simply went too 
far.411 He indicated that anonymity offended notions of due process by depriving the 
defense of its ability to demonstrate that a witness’s testimony could be prejudiced, 
hostile or unreliable.412 And he deplored the potential conviction of a man on such 
serious charges through the use of evidence appearing as nothing more than a 
“disembodied and distorted voice transmitted by electronic means.”413 Given the stakes, 
he concluded, the use of unqualified immunity is not authorized by the Statute insofar as 
it does not comport with the Article 21(4) “minimum guarantee” of the rights of the 
accused.414 
403 ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 21.  
 404 Id. art. 22.  
 405 Tadic Protective Measures Decision, supra note 398, ¶ 26. 
 406 See, e.g., Kostovski Case, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1989) (“The right to a fair administration 
of justice holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that it cannot be sacrificed to expediency  ... 
[The] use of anonymous statements as sufficient evidence to found a conviction [is] irreconcilable with the 
guarantees contained in Article 6 [of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms].” (citations omitted).  
 407 Statistics support the crucial nature of witness testimony at ICTY trials.  For example, from January 
1, 1998 through July 1, 2001, 971 victim-witnesses traveled to testify at ICTY trials in the Hague.  
Furthermore, the use of witnesses increased as work intensified: from July 31, 200 to July 31, 2001, the 
ICTY Victims and Witnesses Section handled 550 witnesses from thirty different countries.  All of these 
witnesses testified in only eight trials conducted that year.  See Wald, supra note 332, at 219.   
 408 Tadic Protective Measures Decision, supra note 398, ¶ 23.  
 409 Id ¶ 27.  
 410 Id. ¶ 28.    
 411 Id. (Stephen, J., dissenting in part).  
 412 Id. ¶ 47. 
 413 Id. ¶ 31.  
 414 Id. ¶ 30.  
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Since Tadic, the ICTY has not granted the extreme remedy of complete witness 
anonymity.415 Nevertheless, one cannot say that the remedy is a “dead letter”416 and the 
specter of anonymity measures hangs over every war crimes prosecution, “given the 
unusual dangers” faced by witnesses and the “limited ability” to protect them.417 As a 
result, “the potential for allowing anonymity from the accused . . . represents a potential 
danger in future adjudication.”418 
b. Victims’ Rights 
 
The future of international criminal justice is poised to alter the juridical status of 
atrocity victims.  The ICC’s Rome Statute gives victims of humanity’s most serious 
crimes a much more significant role than has any previous international criminal 
institution.419 In fact, unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, victims actually have standing in their 
own right at the ICC.   According to the Rome Statute, the ICC must “permit their 
[victims’] views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court.”420 Victims have a right to be heard, as well as 
to speak: the prosecutor and judges must consider victims' interests in making a range of 
decisions, including whether to initiate an investigation into particular allegations421 and 
whether to bring charges.422 
In a recently published decision, the ICC held in its case regarding the Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that victims may participate at the earliest 
stages of an investigation.  In Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6,423 the victims, 
who allegedly suffered human rights abuses at the hands of various uncharged 
 
415 See Wald, supra note 332, at 223; Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1410 (“[L]ater jurisprudence seems to 
be lessening the chance that there will be another case in which witness identity is completely withheld 
from the accused. . .”).  
 416 Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1410.  
 417 See Developments in the Law, International Criminal Law, Fair Trials and the Role of International 
Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1990 (2001) [hereinafter Fair Trials Article].  
 418 Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1438.  Indeed, it has been observed that “the Statute does not take a 
definite position on the admissibility of anonymous testimony whereby a person’s identity is kept secret.  
This topic has been a controversial issue for a long time.  It seems that the question is left to a case-by-case 
balancing between security needs and protection of the defendant’s rights, with the final determination 
made by the judge.”  Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 448. 
 419 See Theo van Boven, The Position of the Victim in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS 77, 77 
(Herman A. M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999). Cf. id. at 81 (noting that “the ICTY Statute and Rules place 
victims largely in an auxiliary role.”). See generally Sam Garkawe, The Victim-Related Provisions of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Victimological Analysis, 8 INT’L REV. VICTOMOLOGY 269 
(2001).  
 420 Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 68(3).  Article 68(3) goes on to state that this must be consistent 
with defendants’ rights.  Id.
421 Id. art. 53(1)(c).  
 422 Id. art. 53(2)(c).  
 423 Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, 
VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04), Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 17 January 2006.  
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perpetrators in the DRC, argued that pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute they 
should be permitted to present to the Chamber their “views and concerns” regarding the 
investigation.424 The Prosecutor opposed the application on, inter alia, the following 
grounds: (1) at that stage there were no “proceedings” within the meaning of article 68(3) 
of the Statute because the word “proceedings” does not encompass the investigation of a 
“situation”; and (2) the participation of the victims at such a preliminary stage would be 
“inappropriate.”425 The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this argument: 
 
The interpretation of article 68(3) as being applicable to the 
investigation stage is . . . consistent with the object and 
purpose of the victims participation regime established by 
the drafters of the Statue, which ensued from a debate that 
took place in the context of the growing emphasis placed 
on the role of victims by the international body of human 
rights law and by international humanitarian law. . . In the 
Chamber's opinion, the Statute grants victims an 
independent voice and role in proceedings before the Court. 
It should be possible to exercise this independence, in 
particular, vis-à-vis the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court so that victims can present their interests. 
As the European Court has affirmed on several occasions, 
victims participating in criminal proceedings cannot be 
regarded as "either the opponent - or for that matter 
necessarily the ally - of the prosecution, their roles and 
objectives being clearly different.426 
In fact, this unique role carved out for victims will have an impact through the 
entire course of ICC proceedings.  What is perhaps the Rome Statute’s most innovative 
provision allows the court to reject a plea bargain or request the presentation of evidence 
against a defendant who has already pled guilty if “a more complete presentation of the 
facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the 
victims.”427 
Such victim empowerment essentially reconfigures the structure of international 
criminal justice.428 Although in principle the enumerated victim rights must be exercised 
 
424 Id. ¶ 23.   
 425 Id. ¶ 25.  Although the Prosecutor did not provide specific reasons, presumably victim participation 
would be “inappropriate” at that stage, inter alia, given its effects on the due process rights of potential 
defendants.  The Chamber had previously appointed an ad hoc defense counsel to represent potential 
interests of any future defendants.  Curiously, although he objected to the participation of these particular 
victims and their counsel [Id. ¶¶ 104, 105], ad hoc defense counsel did not object to the application of 
Article 68(3) at that stage of the proceedings.  Id. ¶ 24.   
 426 Id. ¶¶ 50-51. 
 427 Id. art. 68(4).  
 428 One can draw an analogy between the projected role of victims at the ICC to the contemplated role 
of victims in the American Victims’ Rights Amendment (“VRA”).  Critics of the VRA see it as infringing 
on criminal defendants’ due process rights by adding to the system another structural component tilting 
against the defendant’s interests.  See James M. Dolliver, Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment: A 
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without prejudice to those of the accused, it is difficult to reconcile this with the 
extraordinary influence victims may exert over the process.429 They are suddenly 
endowed with juridical life and can function as juridical actors with a built-in axe to 
grind.430 The prospect of an ICC judge soliciting the views of a quasi-party to the 
litigation, who has been brutalized, disfigured, and dispossessed, could understandably 
send shudders down the collective spine of the international criminal defense bar.   
 
Respect for the rights of defendants requires a neutral, dispassionate setting in 
which relatively neutral, dispassionate actors go about their business.  Such critical 
decisions as initiating an investigation into particular allegations, bringing certain 
charges, or rejecting a plea bargain, traditionally the province of prosecutors and judges 
assumed to be examining the evidence without any untoward motive or bias, may now be 
affected by the moving cries of the fallen.  And due process may suffer as a result.  As 
one commentator points out:  
 
Bad Idea Whose Time Should Not Come, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 87, 90 (1987) (“By constitutionally 
emphasizing the conflict between the victim and the accused and placing the victim in the role of a quasi-
prosecutor or co-counsel, the victims' rights amendment represents a dangerous return to the private blood 
feud mentality.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to 
Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L. J. 1691, 1712 (1997) (stating that, through the 
proposed American Victims’ Rights Amendment, analogous victim participation in the prosecution process 
would effect a “fundamental reconceptualization of criminal litigation” and would diminish defendants’ 
rights); Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 227 (2001-2002) (“While at least twenty-nine states have amended 
their constitutions to protect victims' rights, efforts at amending the U.S. Constitution have met with 
considerably more caution and resistance.   The main obstacle to the "rights" aspect of the movement is the 
concern that these would conflict with or trump defendants' rights).     
 429 See Dolliver, supra note 428, at 90.  
 430 Once again, an analogy to the American Victims’ Rights movement may be instructive.  Certain 
theorists who have considered victims rights in the United States on a more abstract, structural level, 
dispense with identifying either the courts or the prosecutor as “the state” and view both as part of what 
Pierre Bourdieu calls the “juridical field.” According to Bourdieu:  
 
The juridical field is a social space organized around the conversion of 
direct conflict between directly concerned parties into juridically 
regulated debate between professionals acting by proxy. It is also the 
space in which such debate functions. These professionals have in 
common their knowledge and their acceptance of the rules of the legal 
game, that is, the written and unwritten laws of the field itself, even 
those required to achieve victory over the letter of the law . . . . [T]he 
jurist has most often been defined as a “third person mediator.”  In this 
definition, the essential idea is mediation, not decision. 
 
Pierre Bordieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 831 
(1987).   Kanwar posits that the juridical form of sovereignty (mediation) is already a weaker form than the 
political form (decision).  It relies almost entirely on the acceptance of the proxy function of legal 
professionals and the renunciation of direct violence by the “directly concerned parties.”  Kanwar, supra 
note 428, at 253.  Kanwar concludes that the demand for increased accountability to victims “has put new 
constraints on courts, prosecutors, and parole boards, among other juridical actors, and it attacks the very 
raison d'être of the juridical field.”  Id.
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When the rights of victims and the accused seemingly 
conflict, we risk the abrogation of important due process 
rights as their distinction collapses into larger notions of 
justice and fairness . . . While fairness rightly involves the 
simultaneous considerations of victims and accused in 
regard to allegations of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the Tribunals will be wise to isolate the 
important procedural protections for the rights of the 
accused and to prioritize those interests as paramount.431 
Melding this “ICC victims’ bill of rights” into critical procedural stages of its 
criminal litigation schema, the Rome Statute may adulterate, and ultimately dilute, basic 
structural due process protections of ICC defendants.  According to Alison Marston 
Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, the “victim-oriented, civil law model of human rights” 
leads to inordinate [c]oncern for symbolic vindication of violations of victims’ human 
rights” and “has proven a more potent influence than worries over potential violations of 
defendants’ rights.”432 
3. The Right to Jury Trials 
 
Genocide has been called the “crime of crimes.”433 In terms of societal 
opprobrium, crimes against humanity and war crimes feature prominently at the top of 
the list as well.434 These crimes saddle international criminal justice with a tremendous 
burden “because of a perceived duty to convict large numbers of individuals culpable in 
widespread outbreaks of extraordinary evil.”435 Put differently, “the extreme character of 
the crimes alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability 
stronger than in domestic prosecutions.”436 From this premise, John Haberstroh 
concludes: 
 
Ultimately, then, war crime trials and their standards are for 
‘the Hitlers, the Goerings, the Pol Pots, the Milosevics, the 
Karadzics, and other architects of genocide . . .’ Perhaps 
these trials should not be for ‘ordinary murderers,’ as their 
multitudes of purposes may take precedence over the 
dispensation of justice for matters of less-than-
 
431 Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1437.  
 432 Alison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 146 
(2005). 
 433 See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law 
Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 491-92 (2001).  
 434 Id.
435 John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A Paquete Habana Approach to the 
Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 231, 263 (2004).  Haberstroh goes on to observe that “Genocide is 
the exemplar of such evil and the creation of the ad hoc tribunals is commonly understood as an attempt to 
put a stop to that atrocity.”  Id. at 263-64.    
 436 Katz Cogan, supra note 243, at 114.  
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extraordinary evil.  Perhaps this also helps to explain why 
their standards diverge from the practice in U.S. criminal 
courts . . .437 
Among the more conspicuous divergences is the lack of jury trials.438 That the 
architects of our international criminal justice institutions opted for bench trials to 
adjudicate liability is perhaps understandable in the mass atrocity context.  Right or 
wrong, there has been an international perception that jurors are unqualified to sit as 
finders of fact given the complexities of modern international criminal law and the 
expertise required for forensic fact-finding.439 Moreover, there is a fear that jurors will 
be more likely to vote according to their personal biases and popular sentiment than as 
trained professionals.440 
If jurors were impaneled for genocide and war crimes trials, these tendencies 
might very well lead to jury nullification (going either way – unjust conviction or 
acquittal) and the international community has found this prospect unacceptable.441 
According to former U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer, 
one of those architects just mentioned: 
 
But, when you really think about it, you probably do not 
want a jury of twelve peers from all parts of the world to sit 
in judgment of your defendant in this court for these types 
of crimes. You want very expert judges who know the law, 
and who can understand the complexities of atrocity law,442 
to be the judges of your innocence or guilt for these 
particular crimes.443 
437 Haberstroh, supra note 435, at 265.  
 438 One commentator has gone so far as to say that the disutility of acquitting a genocidaire is a harm of 
an order of magnitude greater than that of freeing an ordinary murderer.  See Fair Trials Article, supra note 
417, at 1992. The commentator then asked: “If the presumption of innocence really reflects ‘a rational 
world, should not the prosecutor's burden of persuasion drop considerably in cases involving charges of 
genocide?” Id.
439 See Amy Powell, supra note 225, at 2355 (2004).  
 440 Id.
441 Id. at 2357.  
 442 For an explanation of the term “atrocity law,” see David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 389, 393-402 (2002) (“The crimes include war crimes, genocide, terrorism, 
crimes against humanity, and within the latter term can be found crimes of torture or of slavery or of 
apartheid . . . The international law that is or will be applied by each court varies in description: we speak 
of the law of war, laws and customs of war, the laws of armed conflict, military law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, human rights law.”). While “complexity” could be 
distinguished as a separate rationale for using professional judges, as opposed to lay jurors in these cases, it 
is intimately related to the “gravity” concept because the complexity of the crimes arises, in part, from their 
enormous scale.  By the same token, the overwhelming scale of the mass murder involved is a key 
component of the gravity phenomenon. 
 443 Scheffer, supra note 206, at 1572 (emphasis added).  See also Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, 
Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1312 n.453 (2000) 
(“[There is an] assumption of international criminal law that justice requires an ethnically neutral tribunal 
consisting only of persons disconnected from the tragedies.”); Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an 
International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (1998) (“No credible claim 
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Still, as Ambassador Scheffer himself implicitly acknowledges,444 the absence of 
the jury feature stands out like a due process sore thumb to most common law attorneys.  
For them, it is the bulls-eye on the back of international criminal procedure and they lob 
their verbal grenades at it with glee.445 
D. The Relationship Among the Limiting Forces 
 
Although this Article has treated the phenomena of fragmentation, integration, 
and gravity as separate and discrete concepts, they are to some degree fluid and often 
overlap with one another.  Moreover, consistent with this, the due process protections 
they limit can typically be analyzed through the prism of more than one of them at a time.     
 
Take the right to jury trials, for example.  The analysis above considered the 
absence of jury trials in international criminal courts as a function of the exceptional 
severity of the crime.  While gravity may be a prominent limiting factor, it is certainly not 
the only one.  Integration plays a part as well since, in civil law countries, most cases are 
decided primarily by judges.446 Juries are used only for trying very serious crimes such 
as treason, murder, or kidnapping.447 And even in those cases, lay people sit together 
with professional judges.448 In fact, these countries use the term “jury” to “describe what 
is, in reality, a mixed panel of professional judges and lay people, who deliberate 
together.”449 
Similarly, fragmentation can be seen as a limiting factor with respect to the jury 
trial right.  In particular, an international jury of the defendant’s “peers” would create the 
appearance of justice imposed from the outside, consisting of “world citizens” with no 
understanding of the relevant community experience or ethos.450 Further, the exorbitant 
cost, logistical hurdles, and political complications of selecting jurors from all over the 
world and bringing them to the Hague means that using an international jury would be 
exceptionally difficult, if not practically impossible.451 
of bias could be made against a court composed of distinguished judges from throughout the world 
community.”).  
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And so it goes with the other due process protections.  Those rights affected by 
fragmentation – for example, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, as 
well as arrest and detention – are equally impacted by the gravity phenomenon.  Thus, as 
pointed out previously with respect to search and seizure, States may “ignore the privacy 
interests of suspects or accused persons . . . in the perceived greater interest of  . . . 
eradicating impunity for heinous crimes . . .”452 Similarly, “integration” may affect 
defense efforts to collect evidence.  As noted in connection with the Nuremberg 
experience, civil law defense attorneys are accustomed to a magistrate spearheading 
investigative efforts and often do not grasp the importance of conducting their own 
investigations.453 
The rights constricted by “integration” are also impacted by gravity 
considerations.  Use of documentary evidence at trial, as opposed to live testimony, can 
be perceived, at least in part, as protecting the interests of traumatized victim-witnesses 
unwilling to relive the terror of these depraved crimes in open court.  With respect to 
double jeopardy, the fear of letting a genocidaire walk must certainly factor into the 
world community’s decision to hedge its bets and provide for prosecutorial appeals.  The 
same might be said for the quasi-trial in absentia provided for by the drafters of ICTY 
Rule 61 – better to expose the infamy of war criminals on the lam, they undoubtedly 
reckoned, than to keep their nefarious deeds hidden from public view.454 Fragmentation 
plays a role here as well – many of those war criminals evade capture with the help of 
States and the Rule 61 hearing helps portray them to the world as accessories after the 
fact. 
 
Finally, the rights above that were described as impacted by “gravity” are also 
subject to the other restricting forces.  The overwhelming preference for pretrial 
detention, for example, while certainly affected by the heinousness of the crimes 
committed, is also a function of fragmentation.  Given a global setting, with 
geographically dispersed perpetrators, victims, crime scenes, police forces, prison 
facilities, and courthouses, the international criminal defendant clearly poses a greater 
flight risk than his homebound domestic counterpart.  
 
By the same token, the rights accorded to victims in the ICC setting are not the 
mere product of “gravity.”  Victims of crimes in continental Europe have stronger rights 
to enforce, and take part in, criminal law proceedings than victims in the United States.455 
In addition to the victim’s right in the civil law tradition to attach her tort suit to a 
criminal prosecution, many civil law countries accord victims the right to prosecute 
certain types of crimes if the prosecutor fails to do so.456 Thus, the “integration” 
phenomenon is also responsible for broadening the victim’s role at the expense of the 
defendant’s due process rights. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRULY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE  
So we have reached a crossroads.  The growth of international criminal procedure 
has seen attendant, even structurally intertwined, growth in the due process rights of 
defendants.  But the fully developed national models, to which international due process 
seems to aspire, are fundamentally different.  They do not have the unenviable task of 
harnessing the law enforcement cooperation and resources of free-agent sovereigns, 
fusing together the components of two often-mismatched legal systems, and bringing to 
justice the law’s most depraved monsters.  These are the challenges of international 
criminal institutions and, as this Article has demonstrated, they have, in some respects, 
helped retard the further development of due process.  But is this irreversible? 
 
The indications are that it is not.  Rather than calcify, the process would appear to 
be fluid and dynamic.  And the history of the human rights movement itself helps to 
explain why.  As Professor Dubinsky suggested earlier, the human rights movement has 
evolved in its treatment of criminal matters.457 After being initially focused on atrocity 
prosecution issues (as evidenced by Nuremberg, the Genocide Convention, and the 
Geneva Conventions), it turned its attention to the process by which prosecution is 
achieved.  It sought to ensure fairness for the individual swallowed up by the imposing 
machinery of criminal adjudication and pitted against the limitless resources of the 
State.458 And so followed the UDHR, the ICCPR and a host of other instruments, both 
international and regional, designed to safeguard civil, political and judicial rights.   
 
But with the fall of the Iron Curtain and a new worldwide surge of irredentist and 
ethnic violence, the pendulum began to swing the other way.  Atrocity prosecution was 
again at the fore but this time it reflected the due process advances made during that 
dormant period between Nuremberg and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals.  By 
now, the latter have been in operation for over ten years and are slated to terminate 
operations by this decade’s end.  Although the ICC is just getting under way, the massive 
energy and resources devoted to atrocity prosecution in the 1990s has begun to peter 
out.459 A new phrase, “tribunal fatigue,” has been coined460 and it certainly seems as if 
the pendulum could be swinging back again toward the reform of procedural 
mechanisms.  As this most recent burst of prosecutorial activity comes to an end, the 
world might well reflect, as it did after Nuremberg and Tokyo, on how it could improve 
the way it brings genocidaires and war criminals to justice. 
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What might this entail?  It would be tempting just to politically cherry-pick due 
process features from national jurisdictions, currently lacking at the ad hoc Tribunals and 
the ICC, and simply graft them onto the international mold.  But that would not be 
realistic.  The limiting forces analyzed in this Article, while not necessarily intractable, 
cannot simply be ignored.  Fragmentation will not go away overnight.  Integration is a 
gradual metamorphosis.  And gravity is immutable.   
 
Professor Safferling might have laid out the most realistic road map.  And to use it 
will require a paradigm shift.  Instead of trying to model themselves on national systems, 
international criminal procedure will have to forge its own identity.  “[T]he aim must be a 
truly international criminal procedure which should not be used as a test for the 
credibility of domestic penal systems, but stands solidly on the various traditions of 
criminal procedure.”461 
To perceive fragmentation, integration, and gravity as insurmountable obstacles to 
the achievement of this goal may be unduly pessimistic.  The twentieth century saw the 
birth of the United Nations, an international police force (Interpol), and political, military 
and economic regional integration on an unprecedented scale.462 If the twenty-first 
century is to replicate the pace of these unifying trends, uniform law enforcement 
procedure across national frontiers, and with it the gradual demise of fragmentation, may 
not be that far off.  According to Professor Dianne Marie Amann, that part of the 
paradigm shift is well under way: 
 
Traditionally, how a state chose to fight crime was an 
internal matter. States developed their own methods to 
investigate crimes, to capture and try suspects, and to 
punish criminals. That changed in the last half-century. 
Crime became global, spurring law enforcement officers in 
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individual states to join together in an international attack 
on crime.463 
Similarly, a Procrustean melding of the civil and common law traditions will not 
nullify integration as a limiting force.464 Instead, with due process as its policy lodestar, 
international criminal procedure must judiciously mix and match the best features that 
each system has to offer.465 
The jury trial right comes to mind here.  Perhaps the solution is not simply to 
impose the Anglo-American jury procedure wholesale onto the international criminal trial 
template.  Instead, a mixed panel of professional judges and lay jurors could be used.  
The Continental system avails itself of this procedure for limited crimes.466 The ICC 
could use it for all trials.  This might ease the logistical burden by limiting the requisite 
size of jury pools.  At the same time, it would go far toward insulating the fact-finders 
from perceptions of ignorance and bias, on one hand, and extreme intellectual detachment 
on the other.   
 
Defense access to evidence might be treated in a similar manner.  In the 
international setting, a predominately adversarial model invests the prosecution with a 
significant resource advantage over the defense and provides institutional channels of 
communication with governments, typically not available to the defense, that 
significantly facilitate collection of evidence.467 On the other hand, reliance on the 
inquisitorial model, which designates a juge d’instruction to conduct investigations, could 
result in relatively lackadaisical inquiries.468 A hybrid procedure might employ a 
specially designated pre-trial judge to participate in or oversee the collection of evidence.  
This would promote “equality of arms” by helping to facilitate defense collection of 
evidence abroad and insure prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence.  The ICC 
system, seeking to expand defendants’ due process rights, already involves a certain 
degree of judicial pre-trial oversight of the prosecutor.  A hybrid system extending that 
oversight to the collection of evidence would further level the playing field while 
preserving the inherent assiduousness of prosecutorial investigation.     
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In the end, reform through further hybridization, as opposed to political 
concession, will create a distinctively unique institution, less torn by allegiance to one or 
the other system and more responsive to the special needs of transnational criminal 
practice.469 Professor Bassiouni believes that this process of hybridization, reflected in 
the evolution of an underlying adversarial model in both national and international 
settings, is already well under way:    
 
Contemporaneously, another process of harmonization, or 
at least of rapprochement in the standards of “due process” 
developed at the national levels as evidenced by the laws 
and jurisprudence of the world’s criminal justice systems 
and by the judges who interpret and command respect for 
the norms shared by various states.  The convergence of 
these developments gave rise to general principles of law 
on the subject of “international due process” which the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC have recognized and applied in their 
statutes and in the respective jurisprudence of the ICTY 
and ICTR.470 
Finally, although the perception of genocide and war crimes may never change, 
the way that perception affects their prosecution might.  In this age of the Internet and the 
global village, the world community may eventually become inured to prosecuting crimes 
that are monstrous on a world scale.   
 
In the United States, for example, first-degree murderers get a fair shake at every 
stage of criminal proceedings.471 If anything, in capital cases the system bends over 
backwards to extend every due process consideration possible.472 This happens not 
because society is any less revolted by the sheer evil of such crimes.  It happens because, 
over time, institutional lynch-mob passions abate and society is allowed to appreciate the 
oft-stated maxim that it is better for ten people to go free than for one innocent person to 
go to prison.473 Anesthetizing the world to the process of handling genocide may instill it 
with the same appreciation.   
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And proactive efforts to educate the public about the importance of due process in 
mass atrocity prosecution ought to hasten this process.  To some extent, prosecution and 
legal reform already help serve this role.474 As noted by Shelby Quast, the Director 
General of the International Legal Assistance Consortium: “In the international legal 
community, we hope we can learn a little more each time we are called to assist a post-
conflict society in addressing rule of law and begin to build an evolving catalog of best 
practices to be implemented in the field.”475 But such efforts must also include assiduous 
educational programs.  Quast concludes that: 
 
Even the best laws cannot make a difference if they cannot 
be implemented. Law reform must often be accompanied 
by education that addresses the needs of society to 
understand, adopt, and implement such reforms.476 
Of course, any such reform through education must be directed not only to victim 
societies, but to society at large.  For the latter will help investigate the crimes, apprehend 
the suspects, furnish the administrative and human resources, and dispense the justice.  
The international community must be wary, however, that any such outreach efforts 
result in callous attitudes toward mass atrocity.  Instead, any such program should seek to 
instill sensitization through promotion of human rights values at every stage of social and 
legal transition.  In the prescient words of Justice Murphy dissenting fifty years ago in the 
Yamashita case477:
The immutable rights of the individual . . . belong not alone to the members of 
those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the democratic 
ideology.  They belong to every person in the world, victor or vanquished, 
whatever may be his race, color, or beliefs . . . No exception is made as to those 
who are accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status of enemy 
belligerent.  Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole philosophy 
of human rights. . .478 
. . .
An uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure 
for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting 
harm than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit.  The people’s faith in the 
fairness and objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by that spirit.479 
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